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Abstract. We analyse the computational complexity of finding Nash equilibria in turn-
based stochastic multiplayer games with ω-regular objectives. We show that restricting
the search space to equilibria whose payoffs fall into a certain interval may lead to un-
decidability. In particular, we prove that the following problem is undecidable: Given a
game G, does there exist a Nash equilibrium of G where player 0 wins with probability 1?
Moreover, this problem remains undecidable when restricted to pure strategies or (pure)
strategies with finite memory. One way to obtain a decidable variant of the problem is
to restrict the strategies to be positional or stationary. For the complexity of these two
problems, we obtain a common lower bound of NP and upper bounds of NP and Pspace
respectively. Finally, we single out a special case of the general problem that, in many
cases, admits an efficient solution. In particular, we prove that deciding the existence of
an equilibrium in which each player either wins or loses with probability 1 can be done in
polynomial time for games where the objective of each player is given by a parity condition
with a bounded number of priorities.
1. Introduction
We study stochastic games [53] played by multiple players on a finite, directed graph.
Intuitively, a play of such a game evolves by moving a token along edges of the graph: Each
vertex of the graph is either controlled by one of the players, or it is stochastic. Whenever
the token arrives at a non-stochastic vertex, the player who controls this vertex must move
the token to a successor vertex; when the token arrives at a stochastic vertex, a fixed
probability distribution determines the next vertex. A measurable function maps plays to
payoffs. In the simplest case, which we discuss here, the possible payoffs of a single play are
0 and 1 (i.e. each player either wins or loses a given play). However, due to the presence
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of stochastic vertices, a player’s expected payoff (i.e. her probability of winning) can be an
arbitrary probability.
Stochastic games with ω-regular objectives have been used as a formal model for the
verification and synthesis of reactive systems under the influence of random events [5]. Such
a system is usually modelled as a game between the system and its environment, where the
environment’s objective is the complement of the system’s objective: the environment is
considered hostile. Therefore, the research in this area has traditionally focused on two-
player games where each play is won by precisely one of the two players, so-called two-player
zero-sum games. However, the system may consist of several components with independent
objectives, a situation which is naturally modelled by a multiplayer game.
The most common interpretation of rational behaviour in multiplayer games is captured
by the notion of a Nash equilibrium [52]. In a Nash equilibrium, no player can improve her
payoff by unilaterally switching to a different strategy. Chatterjee et al. [16] gave an algo-
rithm for computing a Nash equilibrium in a stochastic multiplayer game with ω-regular
winning conditions. However, it can be shown that their algorithm may compute an equi-
librium where all players lose almost surely (i.e. receive expected payoff 0), even when there
exist other equilibria where all players win almost surely (i.e. receive expected payoff 1).
In applications, one might look for an equilibrium where as many players as possible
win almost surely or where it is guaranteed that the expected payoff of the equilibrium falls
into a certain interval. Formulated as a decision problem, we want to know, given a k-player
game G with initial vertex v0 and two thresholds a, b ∈ [0, 1]k , whether (G, v0) has a Nash
equilibrium with expected payoff at least x and at most y. This problem, which we call NE
for short, is a generalisation of the quantitative decision problem for two-player zero-sum
games, which asks whether in such a game player 0 has a strategy that ensures to win the
game with a probability that exceeds a given threshold.
The problem NE comes in several variants, depending on the type of strategies one
considers: On the one hand, strategies may be randomised (allowing randomisation over
actions) or pure (not allowing such randomisation). On the other hand, one can restrict
to strategies that use (unbounded or bounded) finite memory or even to stationary ones
(strategies that do not use any memory at all). For the quantitative decision problem, this
distinction is often not meaningful since in a two-player zero-sum simple stochastic game
with ω-regular objectives both players have optimal pure strategies with finite memory.
Moreover, in many games even positional (i.e. both pure and stationary) strategies suffice
for optimality. However, regarding NE this distinction leads to distinct decision problems,
which have to be analysed separately.
Our main result is that NE is undecidable if we allow either arbitrary randomised
strategies or arbitrary pure strategies. In fact, even the following, presumably simpler,
problem is undecidable: Given a game G, decide whether there exists a Nash equilibrium
(in pure strategies) where player 0 wins almost surely. Moreover, the problem remains
undecidable if one restricts to randomised or pure strategies with finite memory.
If we restrict to simpler types of strategies like stationary ones, NE becomes decid-
able. In particular, for positional strategies the problem is typically NP-complete, and for
arbitrary stationary strategies it is NP-hard but typically contained in Pspace. To get a
better understanding of the latter problem, we also relate it to the square root sum problem
(SqrtSum) by providing a polynomial-time reduction from SqrtSum to NE with the restric-
tion to stationary strategies. It is a long-standing open problem whether SqrtSum falls
into the polynomial hierarchy; hence, showing that NE for stationary strategies lies inside
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the polynomial hierarchy would imply a breakthrough in understanding the complexity of
numerical computations.
Finally, we prove decidability for an important fragment of NE, which we call the strictly
qualitative fragment. This fragment arises from NE by restricting the two thresholds to be
the same binary payoff. Hence, we are only interested in equilibria where each player either
wins or loses with probability 1. Formally, the task is to decide, given a k-player game G with
initial vertex v0 and a binary payoff x ∈ {0, 1}k, whether the game has a Nash equilibrium
with expected payoff x. Apart from proving decidability, we show that, depending on the
representation of the objective, this problem is typically complete for one of the complexity
classes P, NP, PNP[log] and Pspace, and that the problem is invariant under restricting the
search space to equilibria in pure finite-state strategies.
Outline. In Section 2, we introduce the model that underlies this work and survey earlier
work on stochastic two-player zero-sum games. In Section 3, we prove that every stochastic
multiplayer game has a Nash equilibrium, thereby addressing an inaccuracy in an earlier
proof by Chatterjee et al. [16]. In Section 4, we analyse the complexity of the problem NE
with respect to the six modes of strategies we consider in this work: positional strategies,
stationary strategies, pure finite-state strategies, randomised finite-state strategies, arbi-
trary pure strategies, and arbitrary randomised strategies. Finally, in Section 5, we prove
that the strictly qualitative fragment of NE is decidable and analyse its complexity.
Related Work. Determining the complexity of Nash equilibria has attracted much interest
in recent years. In particular, a series of papers culminated in the result that computing a
Nash equilibrium of a two-player game in strategic form is complete for the complexity class
PPAD [23, 18]. More in the spirit of our work, Conitzer and Sandholm [20] showed that
deciding whether there exists a Nash equilibrium in a two-player game in strategic form
where player 0 receives payoff at least x and related decision problems are all NP-hard. For
non-stochastic infinite games, a qualitative version of the problem NE was studied in [58].
In particular, it was shown that the problem is NP-complete for games with parity winning
conditions but in P for games with Büchi winning conditions.
For stochastic games, most results concern the computation of values and optimal
strategies; see Section 2 for a survey of the most important results. In the multiplayer
case, Chatterjee et al. [16] showed that the problem of deciding whether a (concurrent)
stochastic game with reachability objectives has a Nash equilibrium in positional strategies
with payoff at least x is NP-complete. We sharpen their hardness result by demonstrating
that the problem remains NP-hard when it is restricted to games with only three players
(as opposed to an unbounded number of players) where payoffs are assigned at terminal
vertices only (cf. Theorem 4.4).
A more restricted model of stochastic games, where questions like ours have been stud-
ied, are Markov decision processes (MDPs) with multiple objectives. These games can be
considered as stochastic games where only one player can influence the outcome of the
game. For MDPs with multiple ω-regular objectives, Etessami et al. [31] showed that ques-
tions like the one we ask are decidable. Their result relies on the fact that, for MDPs with
multiple reachability objectives on terminal states, stationary strategies suffice to achieve a
payoff that is higher than a given threshold. Unfortunately, this property does not extend
to our model: we give an example of a stochastic game with the same kind of objectives
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where every Nash equilibrium with payoff 1 for the fist player requires infinite memory
(see Proposition 4.13).
2. Stochastic games
2.1. Basic definitions. Let us start by giving a formal definition of the game model that
underlies this paper. The games we are interested in are played by multiple players taken
from a finite set Π of players; we usually refer to them as player 0, player 1, player 2, and
so on.
The arena of the game is basically a directed, coloured graph. Intuitively, the players
take turns to form an infinite path through the arena, a play. Additionally, there is an
element of chance involved: at some vertices, it is not a player who decides how to proceed
but nature who chooses a successor vertex according to a probability distribution. To
model this scenario, we partition the set V of vertices into sets Vi of vertices controlled by
player i ∈ Π and a set of stochastic vertices, and we extend the edge relation to a transition
relation that takes probabilities into account. Formally, an arena for a game with players
in Π consists of:
− a countable, non-empty set V of vertices or states,
− for each player i a set Vi ⊆ V of vertices controlled by player i,
− a transition relation ∆ ⊆ V × ([0, 1] ∪ {⊥}) × V , and
− a colouring function χ : V → C into an arbitrary set C of colours.
We make the assumption that every vertex is controlled by at most one player: Vi ∩ Vj = ∅
if i 6= j; vertices that are not controlled by a player are stochastic. For technical reasons,
we also assume that for each vertex v the set
v∆ := {w ∈ V : there exists p ∈ (0, 1] ∪ {⊥} such that (v, p, w) ∈ ∆}
of possible successor vertices is finite and non-empty. Moreover, we require that probabilities
appear only on transitions originating in stochastic vertices (if v ∈ ⋃i∈Π Vi and (v, p, w) ∈ ∆
then p = ⊥) and that they are unique: for every pair of a stochastic vertex v and an
arbitrary vertex w there exists precisely one p ∈ [0, 1] such that (v, p, w) ∈ ∆; we denote this
probability by ∆(w | v). For computational purposes, we assume that these probabilities
are rational numbers. Finally, for each stochastic vertex v the probabilities on outgoing
transitions must sum up to 1:
∑
w∈V ∆(w | v) = 1. Hence, if v is a stochastic vertex,
then the mapping V → [0, 1] : w 7→ ∆(w | v) is a discrete probability distribution over V ;
we denote the set of all discrete probability distributions over V by D(V ).
The description of a game is completed by specifying an objective for each player. On an
abstract level, these are just arbitrary sets of infinite sequences of colours, i.e. subsets of
Cω. Since we want to assign a probability to them, we assume that objectives are Borel
sets over the usual topology on infinite sequences, if not stated otherwise. Since objectives
specify which plays are winning for a player, they are also called winning conditions.
In general, we will identify an objective Win ⊆ Cω over colours with the corresponding
objective χ−1(Win) := {pi ∈ V ω : χ(pi) ∈ Win} ⊆ V ω over vertices (which is also Borel
since χ, as a mapping V ω → Cω, is continuous). The reason that we allow objectives to refer
to a colouring of the vertices is that the number of colours can be much smaller than the
number of vertices, and it is possible that an objective can be represented more succinctly
as an objective over colours rather than as an objective over vertices.
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If Π is a finite set of players, (V, (Vi)i∈Π,∆, χ) is an arena and (Wini)i∈Π is a collec-
tion of objectives, we refer to the tuple G = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π,∆, χ, (Wini)i∈Π) as a stochastic
multiplayer game (SMG). An SMG is finite if the set V of vertices is finite.
A play of G is an infinite path through the arena of G, i.e. a sequence pi = pi(0)pi(1) . . .
of vertices such that for each k ∈ N there exists p ∈ (0, 1]∪{⊥} with (pi(k), p, pi(k + 1)) ∈ ∆.
Finite prefixes of plays are called histories. We say that a play pi of G is won by player i
if the corresponding sequence of colours fulfils player i’s objective, i.e. χ(pi) ∈ Wini; the
payoff of a play pi is the vector x ∈ {0, 1}Π defined by xi = 1 if and only if χ(pi) ∈Wini.
Often, it is convenient to designate an initial vertex v0 ∈ V ; we denote the pair (G, v0) an
initialised SMG. A play or a history of an initialised SMG (G, v0) is just a play respectively
a history of G that starts in v0. In the following, we will refer to both SMGs and initialised
SMGs as SMGs; it should always be clear from the context whether the game is initialised
or not.
SMGs generalise various stochastic models, each of them the subject of intensive re-
search. First, there are Markov chains, the basic model for stochastic processes, in which
no control is possible. These are just SMGs where the set Π of players is empty and
(consequently) there are only stochastic vertices. If we extend Markov chains by a single
controller, we arrive at the model of a Markov decision process (MDP), a model introduced
by Bellman [6] and heavily used in operations research. Formally, an MDP is an SMG where
there is only one player (and only one objective). Finally, in a (perfect-information) sto-
chastic two-player zero-sum game (S2G), there are only two players, player 0 and player 1,
who have opposing objectives: one player wants to fulfil an objective, while the other one
wants to prevent her from doing so. Hence, one player’s objective is the complement of the
other player’s objective. Due to their competitive nature, these games are also known as
competitive Markov decision processes [32].
The SMG model also incorporates several non-stochastic models. In particular, we
call an SMG deterministic if it contains no stochastic vertices. In the two-player zero-sum
setting, the resulting model has found applications in logic and controller synthesis, to name
a few.
2.2. Objectives. We have introduced objectives as abstract sets of infinite sequences. In
order to be amenable for algorithmic solutions, we need to restrict to a class of objectives
representable by finite objects. The objectives we consider for this purpose are standard
in logic and verification (see [37]); for all of them, we require that the set C of colours
the objective refers to is finite. Moreover, whether an infinite sequence α fulfils such an
objective only depends on the set Occ(α) of colours occurring in α or on the set Inf(α) of
colours occurring infinitely often in α. In particular, we deal with the following types of
objectives:
− A reachability objective is given by a set F ⊆ C of good colours, and the objective
requires that a good colour is seen at least once. The corresponding subset of Cω is
Reach(F ) := {α ∈ Cω : Occ(α) ∩ F 6= ∅}.
− A Büchi objective is again given by a set F ⊆ C of good colours, but it requires that a
good colour is seen infinitely often. The corresponding subset of Cω is Bu¨chi(F ) := {α ∈
Cω : Inf(α) ∩ F 6= ∅}.
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− A co-Büchi objective is also given by a set F ⊆ C of good colours; this time, the objective
requires that from some point onwards only good colours are seen. The corresponding
subset of Cω is coBu¨chi(F ) = {α ∈ Cω : Inf(α) ⊆ F}.
− A parity objective is given by a priority function Ω: C → {0, . . . , d}, where d ∈ N, which
assigns to each colour a certain priority. The objective requires that the least priority
that occurs infinitely often is even. The corresponding subset of Cω is Parity(Ω) = {α ∈
Cω : min(Inf(Ω(α))) is even}.
− A Streett objective is given by a set Ω of Streett pairs (F,G), where F,G ⊆ C. The
objective requires that, for each of the pairs, if a colour on the left-hand side is seen
infinitely often, then so is a colour on the right-hand side. The corresponding subset
of Cω is Streett(Ω) = {α ∈ Cω : Inf(α) ∩ F = ∅ or Inf(α) ∩G 6= ∅ for all (F,G) ∈ Ω}.
− A Rabin objective is given by a set Ω of Rabin pairs (F,G), where F,G ⊆ C; it requires
that for some pair a colour on the left-hand side is seen infinitely often while all colours
on the right-hand side are seen only finitely often. The corresponding subset of Cω is
Rabin(Ω) = {α ∈ Cω : Inf(α) ∩ F 6= ∅ and Inf(α) ∩G = ∅ for some (F,G) ∈ Ω}.
− AMuller objective is given by a family F of accepting sets F ⊆ C, and it requires that the
set of colours seen infinitely often equals one of these accepting sets. The corresponding
subset of Cω is Muller(F) = {α ∈ Cω : Inf(α) ∈ F}.
Parity, Streett, Rabin and Muller objectives are of particular relevance because they provide
a standard form for arbitrary ω-regular objectives: any game with arbitrary ω-regular
objectives can be reduced to one with parity, Streett, Rabin or Muller objectives (over a
larger arena) by taking the product of its original arena with a suitable deterministic word
automaton for each player’s objective [56].
In this work, for reasons that will become clear later, we are particularly attracted
to objectives that are invariant under adding and removing finite prefixes; we call such
objectives prefix-independent. More formally, an objective is prefix-independent if for each
α ∈ Cω and x ∈ C∗ the sequence α satisfies the objective if and only if the sequence x·α does.
From the objectives listed above, only reachability objectives are, in general, not prefix-
independent. However, many of our results (in particular, many of our lower bounds) apply
to games with a prefix-independent form of reachability, which we call terminal reachability.
For these objectives, we assume that each vertex is coloured by itself, i.e. C = V , and χ is
the identity mapping. The terminal reachability objective for a set F ⊆ V coincides with the
reachability objective for F , but we require that each v ∈ F is a terminal vertex: v∆ = {v}.
For any such set F , we have Occ(pi) ∩ F 6= ∅ if and only if Inf(pi) ∩ F 6= ∅ for every play pi.
Hence, terminal reachability objectives can be regarded as prefix-independent objectives.
For S2Gs, the distinction between reachability and terminal reachability is not impor-
tant: every S2G with a reachability objective can easily be transformed into an equivalent
S2G with a reachability objective on terminal states. For SMGs, we believe that any such
transformation requires exponential time: deciding whether in a deterministic game with
terminal reachability objectives there exists a play that fulfils each of the objectives can
be done in polynomial time, whereas the same problem is NP-complete for deterministic
games with standard reachability objectives [16, 57].
The resulting hierarchy of objectives is depicted in Fig. 1. As explained above, a simple
reachability objective can be viewed as a (co-)Büchi objective. Any (co-)Büchi objective
is equivalent to a parity objective with only two priorities, and any parity objective is
equivalent to both a Streett and a Rabin objective; in fact, the intersection (union) of two
parity objectives is equivalent to a Streett (Rabin) objective. Moreover, any Streett or
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Streett Rabin
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Figure 1. A hierarchy of prefix-independent objectives.
Rabin objective is equivalent to a Muller objective, although the translation from a set of
Streett/Rabin pairs to an equivalent family of accepting sets is, in general, exponential.
Finally, the complement of a Büchi (Streett) objective is equivalent to a co-Büchi (Rabin)
objective, and vice versa, whereas the complement of a parity (Muller) objective is also a
parity (Muller) objective. In fact, any objective that is equivalent to both a Streett and a
Rabin objective is equivalent to a parity objective [63].
To denote the class of SMGs (S2Gs) with a certain type of objectives, we prefix the
name SMG (S2G) with the name(s) of the objective; for instance, we use the term Streett-
Rabin SMG to denote SMGs where each player has a Streett or a Rabin objective. For
S2Gs, we adopt the convention to name the objective of player 0 first; hence, in a Streett-
Rabin S2G player 0 has a Streett objective, while player 1 has a Rabin objective. Inspired
by Condon [19], we will refer to SMGs with terminal reachability objectives and S2Gs
with a (terminal) reachability objective for player 0 as simple stochastic multiplayer games
(SSMGs) and simple stochastic two-player zero-sum games (SS2Gs), respectively.
Drawing an SMG. When drawing an SMG as a graph, we will use the following conventions:
The initial vertex is marked by a dangling incoming edge. Vertices that are controlled by a
player are depicted as circles, where the player who controls the vertex is given by the label
next to it. Stochastic vertices are depicted as diamonds, where the transition probabilities
are given by the labels on its outgoing edges (the default being equal probabilities on all
outgoing transitions). Finally, terminal vertices are generally represented by their associated
payoff vector. In fact, we allow arbitrary vectors of rational probabilities as payoffs. This
does not increase the power of the model since such a payoff vector can easily be realised
by an SSMG consisting of stochastic and terminal vertices only.
2.3. Strategies and strategy profiles.
2.3.1. Randomised and pure strategies. The notion of a strategy lies at the heart of game
theory. Formally, a (randomised) strategy of player i in an SMG G is a mapping σ : V ∗Vi →
D(V ) assigning to each sequence xv ∈ V ∗Vi of vertices ending in a vertex controlled by
player i a discrete probability distribution over V such that σ(xv)(w) > 0 only if (v,⊥, w) ∈
∆. Instead of σ(xv)(w), we usually write σ(w | xv). We say that a play pi of G is compatible
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with a strategy σ of player i if σ(pi(k + 1) | pi(0) . . . pi(k)) > 0 for all k ∈ N with pi(k) ∈ Vi.
Similarly, a history v0 . . . vk is compatible with σ if σ(vj+1 | v0 . . . vj) > 0 for all 0 ≤ k < n.
A (randomised) strategy profile of G is a tuple σ = (σi)i∈Π where σi is a strategy of
player i in G. We say that a play or a history of G is compatible with a strategy profile σ
if it is compatible with each σi. Given a strategy profile σ = (σj)j∈Π and a strategy τ of
player i, we denote by (σ−i, τ) the strategy profile resulting from σ by replacing σi with τ .
A strategy σ of player i is called pure or deterministic if for each xv ∈ V ∗Vi there exists
w ∈ v∆ with σ(w | xv) = 1; note that a pure strategy of player i can be identified with a
function σ : V ∗Vi → V . A strategy profile σ = (σi)i∈Π is called pure (or deterministic) if
each σi is pure.
2.3.2. The probability space induced by a strategy profile. Given a game G and a strategy
profile σ = (σi)i∈Π of G, the conditional probability of w ∈ V given xv ∈ V ∗V is the number
σi(w | xv) if v ∈ Vi and the probability ∆(w | v) if v is a stochastic vertex; let us denote this
probability by σ(w | xv). Given an initial vertex v0 ∈ V , the probabilities σ(w | xv) give
rise to a probability measure: the probability of a basic cylinder set v0 . . . vk · V ω equals the
product
∏k−1
j=0 σ(vj+1 | v0 . . . vj); basic cylinder sets that start in a vertex different from v0
have probability 0. This definition induces a probability measure on the algebra of cylinder
sets, which—by Carathéodory’s extension theorem—can be extended to a probability mea-
sure on the Borel σ-algebra over V ω; we denote the extended measure by Prσv0 . Finally, by
viewing the colouring function χ : V → C as a continuous function V ω → Cω, we obtain
a probability measure on the Borel σ-algebra over Cω; we abuse notation and denote this
measure also by Prσv0 .
For a strategy profile σ, we are mainly interested in the probabilities pi := Pr
σ
v0(Wini)
of winning. We call pi the (expected) payoff of σ for player i (from v0) and the vector
(pi)i∈Π the (expected) payoff of σ (from v0). Finally, we say that a history xv of (G, v0) is
consistent with σ if Prσv0(xv · V ω) > 0, i.e. if the basic cylinder induced by this history has
positive probability.
In order to apply known results about Markov chains, we can also view the stochastic
process induced by a strategy profile σ as a countable Markov chain Gσ , defined as follows:
The set of states of Gσ is the set V + of all non-empty sequences of vertices in G. The
only transitions from a state xv, where x ∈ V ∗, v ∈ V , are to states of the form xvw,
where w ∈ V , and such a transition occurs with probability p > 0 if and only if either v
is stochastic and (v, p, w) ∈ ∆ or v ∈ Vi and σi(w | xv) = p. Finally, the colouring χ of
vertices is extended to a colouring of states by setting χ(xv) = χ(v) for all x ∈ V ∗ and
v ∈ V . With this definition, we could equivalently define the payoff of σ for player i as the
probability of the event χ−1(Wini) in (Gσ , v0).
For each player i, the Markov decision process Gσ−i is defined just as Gσ, but states
xv ∈ V ∗Vi are controlled by player i (the unique player in Gσ−i), and there is a transition
from such a state to each state of the form xvw, where w ∈ V , with (v,⊥, w) ∈ ∆; player i’s
objective is the same as in G.
2.3.3. Strategies with memory. A memory structure for a game G with vertices in V is a
triple M = (M, δ,m0) where M is a set of memory states, δ : M × V → M is the update
function, and m0 ∈ M is the initial memory. A (randomised) strategy with memory M of
player i is a function σ : M × Vi → D(V ) such that σ(m, v)(w) > 0 only if w ∈ vE. The
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strategy σ is a pure strategy with memory M if additionally the following property holds:
for all m ∈ M and v ∈ V there exists w ∈ V such that σ(m, v)(w) = 1. Hence, a pure
strategy with memory M can be described by a function σ : M × Vi → V . Finally, a (pure)
strategy profile with memory M is a tuple σ = (σi)i∈Π such that each σi is a (pure) strategy
with memory M of player i.
A (pure) strategy σ with memoryM of player i defines a (pure) strategy of player i in the
usual sense as follows: Let δ∗(x) be the memory state after x ∈ V ∗, defined inductively by
δ∗(ε) = m0 and δ
∗(xv) = δ(δ∗(x), v) for x ∈ V ∗ and v ∈ V . If v ∈ Vi, then the distribution
(successor vertex) chosen by the strategy σ for the sequence xv is σ(δ∗(x), v). Vice versa,
every strategy (profile) of G can be viewed as a strategy (profile) with memory M :=
(V ∗, ·, ε).
A finite-state strategy (profile) is a strategy (profile) with memoryM for a finite memory
structure M. Note that a strategy profile is finite-state if and only if each of its strategies is
finite-state. If |M | = 1, we call a strategy (profile) with memory M stationary. Moreover,
we call a pure stationary strategy (profile) a positional strategy (profile). A stationary
strategy of player i can be described by a function σ : Vi → D(V ), and a positional strategy
even by a function σ : Vi → V .
If σ = (σi)i∈Π is a strategy profile with memory M, we coarsen the Markov chain Gσ
by taking M × V as its domain. The transition relation is defined as follows: there is
a transition from (m, v) to (n,w) with probability p > 0 if and only if δ(m, v) = n and
either v is a stochastic vertex of G and (v, p, w) ∈ ∆ or v ∈ Vi and σi(m, v)(w) = p. Finally,
a state (m, v) has the same colour as the vertex v in G. Analogously, we coarsen the Markov
decision process Gσ−i by usingM ×V as its domain: vertices (m, v) ∈M×Vi are controlled
by player i, and there is a transition from such a vertex (m, v) to (n,w) ∈ M × V if and
only if n = δ(m, v) and (v,⊥, w) ∈ ∆. Note that the arenas of both Gσ and Gσ−i are finite
if the memory M and the original arena of G are finite.
2.3.4. Residual games and strategies. Given an SMG G and a sequence x ∈ V ∗ (which is
usually a history), the residual game G[x] has the same arena as G but different objectives:
if Wini ⊆ Cω is the objective of player i in G, then her objective in G[x] is χ(x)−1Wini :=
{α ∈ Cω : χ(x) ·α ∈Wini}. In particular, if all objectives in G are prefix-independent, then
G[x] = G.
If player i plays according to a strategy σ in G, then the corresponding strategy in G[x] is
the residual strategy σ[x], defined by σ[x](yv) = σ(xyv). If σ = (σi)i∈Π is a strategy profile,
then the residual strategy profile σ[x] is just the profile of the residual strategies σi[x]. The
following lemma, taken from [64], shows how to compute probabilities with respect to a
residual strategy profile.
Lemma 2.1. Let σ be a strategy profile of an SMG (G, v0), and let xv ∈ V ∗V . If X ⊆ V ω
is a Borel set, then Prσv0(X ∩ xv · V ω) = Prσv0(xv · V ω) · Prσ[x]v (x−1X).
2.4. Subarenas and end components. Algorithms for stochastic games often employ a
divide-and-conquer approach and compute a solution for a complex game from the solution
of several smaller games. These smaller games are usually obtained from the original game
by restricting to a subarena. Formally, given an SMG G, a set U ⊆ V is a subarena if
− U 6= ∅,
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− v∆ ∩ U 6= ∅ for each v ∈ U , and
− v∆ ⊆ U for each stochastic vertex v ∈ U .
Clearly, if U is a subarena, then the restriction of G to vertices in U is again an SMG, which
we denote by G ↾ U . Formally,
G ↾ U := (Π, U, (Vi ∩ U)i∈Π,∆ ∩ (U × ([0, 1] ∪ {⊥})× U), χU , (Wini)i∈Π),
where χU : U → C : u 7→ χ(u) is the restriction of the colouring function to U .
Of particular interest are the strongly connected subarenas of a game because they can
arise as the sets Inf(pi) of vertices visited infinitely often in a play; we call these sets end
components. Formally, a set U ⊆ V is an end component if U is a subarena and every
vertex w ∈ U is reachable from every other vertex v ∈ U , i.e. there exists a sequence
v = v1, v2, . . . , vn = w such that vi+1 ∈ vi∆ for each 0 < i < n. An end component U
is maximal in a set S ⊆ V if there is no end component U ′ such that U ( U ′ ⊆ S. For
any finite subset S ⊆ V , the set of all end components maximal in S can be computed in
quadratic time [24].
The theory of end components has been developed by de Alfaro [24, 25] and Courcou-
betis and Yannakakis [21, 22]. The central fact about end components in finite SMGs is
that, under any strategy profile, the set of vertices visited infinitely often is almost surely
an end component.
Lemma 2.2. Let G be a finite SMG. Then Prσv ({pi ∈ V ω : Inf(pi) is an end component}) = 1
for each strategy profile σ of G and each v ∈ V .
Moreover, for any end component U , we can construct a stationary strategy profile, or
alternatively a pure finite-state strategy profile, that, when started in U , guarantees almost
surely to visit all and only the vertices in U infinitely often. In fact, the stationary profile
that chooses for each vertex in U a successor in U uniformly at random fulfils this property.
Lemma 2.3. Let G be a finite SMG and U one of its end components. There exists both a
stationary and a pure finite-state strategy profile σ such that Prσv ({pi ∈ V ω : Inf(α) = U}) =
1 for every vertex v ∈ U .
Given an SMG G with (objectives representable as) Muller objectives given by a fam-
ily Fi of accepting sets, we say that an end component U is winning for player i if χ(U) ∈ Fi;
the payoff of U is the vector z ∈ {0, 1}Π, defined by zi = 1 if and only if U is winning for
player i.
2.5. Values, determinacy and optimal strategies. Given a strategy τ of player i in G
and a vertex v ∈ V , the value of τ from v is the number valτ (v) := infσ Prσ−i,τv (Wini),
where σ ranges over all strategy profiles of G. Moreover, the value of G for player i from v
is the supremum of these values: valGi (v) := supτ val
τ (v), where τ ranges over all strategies
of player i in G. Intuitively, valGi (v) is the maximal payoff that player i can ensure when
the game starts from v.
Given an initial vertex v0 ∈ V , a strategy τ of player i in G is called (almost-surely)
winning if valτ (v0) = 1. More generally, τ is called optimal if val
τ (v0) = val
G
i (v0). For ε > 0,
it is called ε-optimal if valτ (v0) ≥ valGi (v0)− ε. A globally (ε-)optimal strategy is a strategy
that is (ε-)optimal for every possible initial vertex v0 ∈ V . Note that optimal strategies
need not exist since the supremum in the definition of valGi is not necessarily attained;
THE COMPLEXITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN STOCHASTIC MULTIPLAYER GAMES 11
in this case, only ε-optimal strategies do exist. Also note that there exists a globally (ε-)
optimal strategy whenever there exists an (ε-)optimal strategy for every possible initial
vertex. Finally, we say that a strategy τ of player i in (G, v0) is strongly optimal if the
residual strategy τ [x] is optimal in the residual game (G[x], v) for every history xv of (G, v0)
that is compatible with τ . Intuitively, a strategy is strongly optimal if it is also optimal
when the other players do not play optimally. Note that, for games with prefix-independent
objectives, any globally optimal positional strategy profile is also strongly optimal.
Determining values and finding optimal strategies in SMGs actually reduces to per-
forming the same tasks in S2Gs. Formally, given an SMG G, define for each player i the
coalition game Gi to be the same game as G but with only two players: player i acting as
player 0 and the coalition Π \ {i} acting as player 1. The coalition controls all vertices that
in G are controlled by some player j 6= i, and its objective is the complement of player i’s
objective in G. Clearly, Gi is an S2G, and valGi(v) = valGi (v) for every vertex v. Moreover,
any (strongly, ε-) optimal strategy for player i in (G, v0) is (strongly, ε-) optimal in (Gi, v0),
and vice versa. Hence, when we study values and optimal strategies, we can restrict to S2Gs.
A celebrated theorem due to Martin [48] and Maitra and Sudderth [47] states that S2Gs
with Borel objectives are determined: valG0 = 1 − valG1 . The number valG(v) := valG0 (v) is
consequently called the value of G from v. In fact, an inspection of the proof shows that
for turn-based games both players not only have randomised ε-optimal strategies but pure
ε-optimal strategies.
Theorem 2.4 ([48, 47]). Every S2G with Borel objectives is determined; for all ε > 0, both
players have ε-optimal pure strategies.
For finite S2Gs with prefix-independent objectives, we can show a stronger result than
Theorem 2.4: in these games, both players not only have ε-optimal pure strategies but
optimal ones [36]. In fact, the proof reveals the existence of strongly optimal strategies (see
also [59]).
Theorem 2.5 ([36]). In any finite S2G with prefix-independent objectives, both players
have strongly optimal pure strategies.
For finite S2Gs with ω-regular objectives, more attractive strategies than arbitrary pure
strategies suffice for optimality. In particular, in any finite Rabin-Streett S2G there exists
a globally optimal positional strategy for player 0 [46, 17].
Theorem 2.6 ([46, 17]). In any finite Rabin-Streett S2G, player 0 has a globally optimal
positional strategy.
A consequence of Theorem 2.6 is that the values of a finite Rabin-Streett S2G are
rational of polynomial bit complexity in the size of the arena: Given a positional strategy
profile σ of G, the finite MDP Gσ−1 is not larger than the game G. Moreover, if σ0 is globally
optimal, then for every vertex v the value of G from v and the value of Gσ−1 from v sum up
to 1. But the values of any Streett MDP form the optimal solution of a linear programme
of polynomial size (see [24]) and are therefore rational of small bit complexity.
Of course, it also follows from Theorem 2.6 that finite parity S2Gs are positionally
determined: both players have globally optimal positional strategies. This result was first
proven for deterministic games (even over infinite arenas), independently by Emerson and
Jutla [28] and Mostowski [51]. For SS2Gs, the existence of optimal positional strategies
follows from a result of Bewley and Kohlberg [7]. Independently, McIver and Morgan [49],
Chatterjee et al. [15] and Zielonka [64] extended these results to parity S2Gs.
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Corollary 2.7. In any finite parity S2G, both players have globally optimal positional
strategies.
Since every finite S2G with ω-regular objectives can be reduced to one with parity
objectives, we can conclude from Corollary 2.7 that both players have residually optimal
pure finite-state strategies in finite S2Gs with arbitrary ω-regular objectives.
Corollary 2.8. In any finite S2G with ω-regular objectives, both players have strongly
optimal pure finite-state strategies.
2.6. Algorithmic problems. For the rest of this section, we only consider finite two-
player zero-sum games. The main computational problems for these games are computing
the value and optimal strategies for one or both players. Instead of computing the value
exactly, we can ask whether the value is greater than some given rational probability p,
a problem which we call the quantitative decision problem:
Given an S2G G, a vertex v and a rational number p ∈ [0, 1], decide whether
valG(v) ≥ p.
In many cases, it suffices to know whether the value is 1, i.e. whether player 0 has a
strategy to win the game almost surely (asymptotically, at least). We call the resulting
decision problem the qualitative decision problem.
Clearly, if we can solve the quantitative decision problem, we can approximate the val-
ues valG(v) up to any desired precision by using binary search. In fact, for parity S2Gs it is
well-known that it suffices to solve the decision problems, since the other problems (com-
puting the values and optimal strategies) are polynomial-time equivalent to the quantitative
decision problem.
For a Markov decision process whose objective can be represented as a Muller objective,
we can compute the values by an analysis of its end components: For a given initial vertex v,
the value of the MDP from v equals the maximal probability of reaching a winning end
component from v; this probability can be computed using linear programming.
Even though, the number of end components can be exponential, it is easy to see that
the union of all winning end components can be computed in polynomial time for MDPs
with Rabin or Muller objectives (given by a family of accepting sets). For MDPs with
Streett objectives, Chatterjee et al. [17] gave a polynomial-time algorithm for computing
this set. Hence, for MDPs with any of these objectives, the quantitative decision problem
is solvable in polynomial time.
Theorem 2.9 ([24, 17]). The quantitative decision problem is in P for Streett, Rabin or
Muller MDPs.
It follows from Theorems 2.6 and 2.9 that the quantitative decision problem for Rabin-
Streett S2Gs is in NP: to decide whether valG(v) ≥ p, it suffices to guess a positional
strategy for player 0 and to check whether in the resulting Streett MDP the value from v
is not smaller than p. By determinacy, this result implies that the quantitative decision
problem is in coNP for Streett-Rabin S2Gs and in NP ∩ coNP for parity S2Gs.
Corollary 2.10. The quantitative decision problem is
− in NP for Rabin-Streett S2Gs,
− in coNP for Streett-Rabin S2Gs, and
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Table 1. The complexity of deciding the value in S2Gs.
Qualitative Quantitative
SS2Gs P-complete NP ∩ coNP
Parity[d] P-complete NP ∩ coNP
Parity UP ∩ coUP NP ∩ coNP
Rabin-Streett NP-complete NP-complete
Streett-Rabin coNP-complete coNP-complete
Muller Pspace-complete Pspace-complete
− in NP ∩ coNP for parity S2Gs.
A corresponding NP-hardness result for deterministic Rabin-Streett S2Gs was estab-
lished by Emerson and Jutla [29]. In particular, this hardness result also holds for the
qualitative decision problem. Moreover, by determinacy, this result can be turned into a
coNP-hardness result for (deterministic) Streett-Rabin S2Gs.
For S2Gs with Muller objectives, Chatterjee [13] showed that the quantitative decision
problem falls into Pspace; for deterministic games, a polynomial-space algorithm had been
given earlier by McNaughton [50]. A matching lower bound for deterministic games with
Muller objectives was provided by Hunter and Dawar [42].
Theorem 2.11 ([13, 42]). The quantitative and the qualitative decision problem are
Pspace-complete for Muller S2Gs.
Theorem 2.11 does not hold if the Muller objective is given by a family of subsets of
vertices: Horn [41, 40] showed that the qualitative decision problem for explicit Muller S2Gs
is in P, and that the quantitative problem is in NP ∩ coNP.
Another class of S2Gs for which the qualitative decision problem is in P is, for each
d ∈ N, the class Parity[d] of all parity S2Gs whose priority function refers to at most
d priorities [26]. In particular, the qualitative decision problem for SS2Gs as well as (co-)
Büchi S2Gs is in P. For general parity S2Gs, however, the qualitative decision problem is
only known to lie in UP ∩ coUP [44, 14].
Theorem 2.12 ([44, 14, 26]). The qualitative decision problem is in UP ∩ coUP for parity
S2Gs. For each d ∈ N, the qualitative decision problem is in P for parity S2Gs with at most
d priorities.
Table 1 summarises the results about the complexity of the quantitative and the qual-
itative decision problem for S2Gs. P-hardness (via Logspace-reductions) for all these
problems follows from the fact that and-or graph reachability is P-complete [43].
The results summarised in Table 1 leave open the possibility that at least one of the
following problems is decidable in polynomial time:
(1) the qualitative decision problem for parity S2Gs,
(2) the quantitative decision problem for SS2Gs,
(3) the quantitative decision problem for parity S2Gs.
Note that, given that all of them are contained in both NP and coNP, it is unlikely that
one of them is NP-hard or coNP-hard; such a result would imply that NP = coNP, and the
polynomial hierarchy would collapse.
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For the first problem, Chatterjee et al. [14] gave a polynomial-time reduction to the
qualitative decision problem for deterministic two-player zero-sum parity games. Hence,
solving the qualitative decision problem for parity S2Gs is not harder than deciding which
of the two players has a winning strategy in a deterministic two-player zero-sum parity
game. Whether the latter problem is decidable in polynomial time is a long-standing open
problem. Several years after Emerson and Jutla [28] put the problem into NP ∩ coNP,
Jurdziński [44] improved this bound slightly to UP ∩ coUP. Together with Paterson and
Zwick [45], he also gave an algorithm that decides the winner in subexponential time;
a randomised subexponential algorithm had been given earlier by Björklund et al. [9]. On
the other hand, Friedmann [33] recently showed that the most promising candidate for a
polynomial-time algorithm for the general case so far, the discrete strategy improvement
algorithm due to Vöge and Jurdziński [61], requires exponential time in the worst case.
Regarding the second problem, only some progress towards a polynomial-time algorithm
has been made since Condon [19] proved membership in NP ∩ coNP; for instance, Björk-
lund and Vorobyov [8] gave a randomised subexponential algorithm for solving SS2Gs, and
Gimbert and Horn [35] showed that the quantitative decision problem for SS2Gs is fixed-
parameter tractable with respect to the number of stochastic vertices as the parameter.
For the third problem, Andersson and Miltersen [2] recently established a polynomial-
time Turing reduction to the second. Hence, there exists a polynomial-time algorithm
for (2) if and only if there exists one for (3). In particular, a polynomial-time algorithm
for (2) would also give a polynomial-time algorithm for (1). However, to the best of our
knowledge, it is plausible that the qualitative decision problem for parity S2Gs is in P while
the quantitative decision problem for SS2Gs is not.
3. Existence of Nash equilibria
To capture rational behaviour of selfish players, Nash [52] introduced the notion of—what
is now called—a Nash equilibrium. Formally, given a strategy profile σ of a game (G, v0),
we call a strategy τ of player i in G a best response to σ if τ maximises the expected payoff of
player i: Pr
σ−i,τ
′
v0 (Wini) ≤ Prσ−i,τv0 (Wini) for all strategies τ ′ of player i. A strategy profile
σ = (σi)i∈Π is a Nash equilibrium if each σi is a best response to σ.
In a Nash equilibrium, no player can improve her payoff by unilaterally switching to a
different strategy. In fact, to have a Nash equilibrium, it suffices that no player can gain
from switching to a pure strategy.
Proposition 3.1. A strategy profile σ of a game (G, v0) is a Nash equilibrium if and only if,
for each player i and for each pure strategy τ of player i in G, Prσ−i,τv0 (Wini) ≤ Prσv0(Wini).
Proof. Clearly, if σ is a Nash equilibrium, then Pr
σ−i,τ
v0 (Wini) ≤ Prσv0(Wini) for each pure
strategy τ of player i in G. Now, assume that σ is not a Nash equilibrium. Hence, p :=
supτ Pr
σ−i,τ
v0 (Wini) = Pr
σ
v0(Wini)+ε for some player i and some ε > 0. Consider the Markov
decision process Gσ−i . Clearly, the value of Gσ−i from v0 equals p. By Theorem 2.4, there
exists an ε/2-optimal pure strategy τ in (Gσ−i , v0). Since the arena of Gσ−i is a forest, we
can assume that τ is a positional strategy, which can be viewed as a pure strategy in G.
We have Pr
σ−i,τ
v0 (Wini) ≥ p− ε/2 > p− ε = Prσv0(Wini).
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For two-player zero-sum games, a Nash equilibrium is just a pair of optimal strategies.
Proposition 3.2. Let (G, v0) be an S2G. A strategy profile (σ, τ) of (G, v0) is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if both σ and τ are optimal. In particular, every Nash equilibrium
of (G, v0) has payoff (valG(v0), 1− valG(v0)).
Proof. (⇒) Assume that both σ and τ are optimal, but that (σ, τ) is not a Nash equilibrium.
Hence, one of the players, say player 1, can improve her payoff by playing some strategy τ ′.
Hence, valG(v0) = Pr
σ,τ
v0 (Win0) > Pr
σ,τ ′
v0 (Win0). However, since σ is optimal, val
G(v0) ≤
Prσ,τ
′
v0 (Win0), a contradiction. The reasoning in the case that player 0 can improve is
analogous.
(⇐) Let (σ, τ) be a Nash equilibrium of (G, v0), and let us first assume that σ is not
optimal, i.e. valσ(v0) < val
G(v0). By the definition of val
G , there exists another strategy σ′
of player 0 such that valσ(v0) < val
σ′(v0) ≤ valG(v0). We have
Prσ,τv0 (Win0) ≤ valσ(v0) < valσ
′
(v0) = infτ ′ Pr
σ′,τ ′
v0 (Win0) ≤ Prσ
′,τ
v0 (Win0),
where the first inequality follows from the fact that (σ, τ) is a Nash equilibrium. Thus,
player 0 can improve her payoff by playing σ′ instead of σ, a contradiction to (σ, τ) being
a Nash equilibrium. The argumentation in the case that τ is not optimal is analogous.
In general, a Nash equilibrium can give a player a higher payoff than her value. However,
the payoff a player receives in a Nash equilibrium can never be lower than her value, and
this is true for every history that is consistent with the equilibrium. Formally, we say that
a strategy profile σ of a game (G, v0) is favourable if Prσv0(Wini | xv · V ω) ≥ val
G[x]
i (v) for
each player i and every history xv that is consistent with σ.
Lemma 3.3. Let (G, v0) be an SMG. Every Nash equilibrium of (G, v0) is favourable.
Proof. Assume there exists a history xv of (G, v0) that is consistent with σ, but p :=
Prσv0(Wini | xv · V ω) < val
G[x]
i (v). By the definition of val
G[x]
i , there exists a strategy τ of
player i in G[x] such that valτ (v) > p. We define a new strategy σ′ for player i in G as
follows: σ′ is defined as σi for histories that do not begin with xv. For histories of the
form xvy, however, we set σ′(xvy) = τ(vy). Clearly, Pr
σ−i,σ′
v0 (xv · V ω) = Prσv0(xv · V ω).
Moreover, it is easy to see that Pr
σ−i,σ
′
v0 (X \ xv · V ω) = Prσv0(X \ xv · V ω) for every Borel
set X ⊆ V ω. Using Lemma 2.1, we can conclude that
Prσ−i,σ
′
v0 (Wini)
= Prσ−i,σ
′
v0 (Wini \ xv · V ω) + Prσ−i,σ
′
v0 (Wini ∩ xv · V ω)
= Prσv0(Wini \ xv · V ω) + Prσ[x]−i,σ
′[x]
v (x
−1Wini) · Prσ−i,σ′v0 (xv · V ω)
= Prσv0(Wini \ xv · V ω) + Prσ[x]−i,τv (x−1Wini) · Prσv0(xv · V ω)
≥ Prσv0(Wini \ xv · V ω) + valτ (v) · Prσv0(xv · V ω)
> Prσv0(Wini \ xv · V ω) + p · Prσv0(xv · V ω)
= Prσv0(Wini \ xv · V ω) + Prσv0(Wini | xv · V ω) · Prσv0(xv · V ω)
= Prσv0(Wini \ xv · V ω) + Prσv0(Wini ∩ xv · V ω)
= Prσv0(Wini) .
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Hence, player i can improve her payoff by switching to σ′, a contradiction to σ being a Nash
equilibrium.
It follows from Theorem 2.5 and Proposition 3.2 that every finite two-player zero-
sum stochastic game with prefix-independent objectives has a Nash equilibrium in pure
strategies. Is this still true if the two-player zero-sum assumption is relaxed?
By Lemma 3.3, a pure strategy profile can only be a Nash equilibrium if it is favourable.
The next lemma shows that, conversely, we can turn every favourable pure strategy profile
into a Nash equilibrium. The proof uses so-called threat strategies (or trigger strategies),
which are added on top of the given strategy profile: each player threatens to change her
behaviour when one of the other players deviates from the prescribed strategy profile. Before
being applied to stochastic games, this concept proved fruitful in the related area of repeated
games (see [54, Chapter 8] and [3]).
Lemma 3.4. Let (G, v0) be a finite SMG with prefix-independent objectives. If σ is a
favourable pure strategy profile of (G, v0), then (G, v0) has a pure Nash equilibrium σ∗ with
Prσv0 = Pr
σ∗
v0 .
Proof. By Theorem 2.5, for each player i we can fix a globally optimal pure strategy τi
of the coalition Π \ {i} in the coalition game Gi; denote by τj,i the corresponding pure
strategy of player j 6= i in G. To simplify notation, we also define τi,i to be an arbitrary
pure strategy of player i in G. Player i’s equilibrium strategy σ∗i is defined as follows:
For histories xv that are compatible with σ, we set σ∗i (xv) = σi(xv). If xv is not compatible
with σ, then decompose x into x = x1 · x2, where x1 is the longest prefix of x that is
compatible with σ, and let j be the player who has deviated, i.e. x1 ends in Vj ; we set
σ∗i (xv) = τi,j(x2v). Intuitively, σ
∗
i behaves like σi as long as no other player j deviates from
playing σj , in which case σ
∗
i starts to behave like τi,j.
Note that Prσ
∗
v0 = Pr
σ
v0 . We claim that σ
∗ is additionally a Nash equilibrium of (G, v0).
Let i ∈ Π, and let ρ be a pure strategy of player i in G; by Proposition 3.1, it suffices to
show that Pr
σ∗−i,ρ
v0 (Wini) ≤ Prσ
∗
v0 (Wini).
Let us call a history xv ∈ V ∗Vi a deviation history if xv is compatible with both σ and
(σ−i, ρ), but σi(xv) 6= ρ(xv); we denote the set of all deviation histories consistent with σ
by D. Clearly, Prσv0(xv · V ω) = Prσ
∗
v0 (xv · V ω) = Pr
σ∗−i,ρ
v0 (xv · V ω) for all xv ∈ D.
Claim. Pr
σ∗−i,ρ
v0 (X \D · V ω) = Prσv0(X \D · V ω) for every Borel set X ⊆ V ω.
Proof. This claim can be proved by an induction over the structure of Borel set.
Claim. Pr
σ∗−i,ρ
v0 (Wini | xv · V ω) ≤ valGi (v) for every xv ∈ D.
Proof. By the definition of the strategies τj,i, we have that Pr
(τj,i)j 6=i,ρ
v (Wini) ≤ valGi (v) for
every vertex v ∈ V and every strategy ρ of player i. Moreover, if xv is a deviation history,
then for each player j 6= i the residual strategy σ∗j [xv] is equal to τj,i on histories that start
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in w := ρ(xv). Hence, by Lemma 2.1 and since Wini is prefix-independent,
Pr
σ∗−i,ρ
v0 (Wini | xv · V ω)
= Pr
σ∗−i,ρ
v0 (Wini | xvw · V ω)
= Pr
σ∗−i[xv],ρ[xv]
w (Wini)
≤ valGi (w)
≤ valGi (v) .
Using the previous two claims, we prove that Pr
σ∗−i,ρ
v0 (Wini) ≤ Prσ
∗
v0 (Wini) as follows:
Pr
σ∗−i,ρ
v0 (Wini)
= Pr
σ∗−i,ρ
v0 (Wini \D · V ω) +
∑
xv∈D
Pr
σ∗−i,ρ
v0 (Wini ∩ xv · V ω)
= Prσv0(Wini \D · V ω) +
∑
xv∈D
Pr
σ∗−i,ρ
v0 (Wini ∩ xv · V ω)
= Prσv0(Wini \D · V ω) +
∑
xv∈D
Pr
σ∗−i,ρ
v0 (Wini | xv · V ω) · Pr
σ∗−i,ρ
v0 (xv · V ω)
= Prσv0(Wini \D · V ω) +
∑
xv∈D
Pr
σ∗−i,ρ
v0 (Wini | xv · V ω) · Prσv0(xv · V ω)
≤ Prσv0(Wini \D · V ω) +
∑
xv∈D
valGi (v) · Prσv0(xv · V ω)
≤ Prσv0(Wini \D · V ω) +
∑
xv∈D
Prσv0(Wini | xv · V ω) · Prσv0(xv · V ω)
= Prσv0(Wini \D · V ω) +
∑
xv∈D
Prσv0(Wini ∩ xv · V ω)
= Prσv0(Wini)
= Prσ
∗
v0 (Wini),
where the second inequality follows from the assumption that σ is favourable.
A variant of Lemma 3.4 handles games with prefix-independent ω-regular objectives
and finite-state strategies.
Lemma 3.5. Let (G, v0) be a finite SMG with prefix-independent ω-regular objectives. If
σ is a favourable pure finite-state strategy profile of (G, v0), then (G, v0) has a pure finite-
state Nash equilibrium σ∗ with Prσv0 = Pr
σ∗
v0 .
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 3.4. Since, by Corollary 2.8, there
exist optimal pure finite-state strategies in every finite SMG with ω-regular objectives, the
strategies τj,i defined there can be assumed to be pure finite-state strategies. Consequently,
the equilibrium profile σ∗ can be implemented using finite-state strategies as well.
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v0
0
(0, 0)
v1
1
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Figure 2. A two-player game with a pair of optimal strategies that cannot be extended
to a Nash equilibrium.
Using Lemma 3.4 and Theorem 2.5, we can easily prove the existence of pure Nash
equilibria in finite SMGs with prefix-independent objectives.
Theorem 3.6. There exists a pure Nash equilibrium in any finite SMG with prefix-
independent objectives.
Proof. Let G be a finite SMG with prefix-independent objectives and initial vertex v0. By
Theorem 2.5 and the correspondence between G and the coalition game Gi, each player i has
a strongly optimal strategy σi in G. Let σ = (σi)i∈Π. For every history xv that is consistent
with σ and each player i, we have Prσv0(Wini | xv · V ω) = Prσ[x]v (Wini) ≥ valGi (v). Hence,
σ is favourable, and Lemma 3.4 implies the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium.
For finite SMGs with ω-regular objectives, we can even show the existence of a pure
finite-state equilibrium.
Theorem 3.7. There exists a pure finite-state Nash equilibrium in any finite SMG with
ω-regular objectives.
Proof. Since any SMG with ω-regular objectives can be reduced to one with parity objec-
tives using finite memory, it suffices to consider parity SMGs. For these games, the claim
follows from Corollary 2.7 and Lemma 3.5 using the same argumentation as in the proof of
Theorem 3.6.
Theorem 3.7 and a variant of Theorem 3.6 appeared originally in [16]. However, their
proof contains an inaccuracy: Essentially, they claim that any profile of optimal strategies
can be extended to a Nash equilibrium with the same payoff (by adding threat strategies
on top). This is, in general, not true, as the following example demonstrates.
Example 3.8. Consider the deterministic two-player game (G, v0) depicted in Fig. 2 and
played by players 0 and 1 (with payoffs given in this order). Clearly, the value valG0 (v0)
for player 0 from v0 equals 1, and player 0’s optimal strategy σ is to play from v0 to v1.
For player 1, the value from v0 is 0, and both of her positional strategies are optimal. In
particular, her strategy τ of playing from v1 to the terminal vertex with payoff (1, 0) is
optimal (albeit not globally optimal). The payoff of the strategy profile (σ, τ) is (1, 0).
However, there is no Nash equilibrium of (G, v0) with payoff (1, 0): In any Nash equilibrium
of (G, v0), player 0 will move from v0 to v1 with probability 1. Player 1’s best response is
to play from v1 to the terminal vertex with payoff (1, 1) with probability 1. Hence, every
Nash equilibrium of this game has payoff (1, 1).
THE COMPLEXITY OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN STOCHASTIC MULTIPLAYER GAMES 19
4. Complexity of Nash equilibria
For the rest of this paper, we consider only finite SMGs. Previous research on algorithms for
finding Nash equilibria in such games has focused on computing some Nash equilibrium [16].
However, a game may have several Nash equilibria with different payoffs, and one might not
be interested in any Nash equilibrium but in one whose payoff fulfils certain requirements.
For example, one might look for a Nash equilibrium where certain players win almost surely
while certain others lose almost surely. This idea leads us to the following decision problem,
which we call NE:
Given an SMG (G, v0) and thresholds x, y ∈ [0, 1]Π, decide whether there
exists a Nash equilibrium of (G, v0) with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y.
To obtain meaningful results, we assume that all transition probabilities in G as well as
the thresholds x and y are rational numbers (with numerator and denominator given in
binary) and that all objectives are ω-regular. A qualitative variant of the problem, which
omits the thresholds, just asks about a Nash equilibrium where some distinguished player,
say player 0, wins with probability 1:
Given an SMG (G, v0), decide whether there exists a Nash equilibrium of
(G, v0) where player 0 wins almost surely.
Clearly, every instance of the qualitative variant can easily be turned into an instance of NE
(by adding the thresholds x = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and y = (1, . . . , 1)). Hence, NE is, a priori, more
general than its qualitative variant.
Note that we have so far not put any restriction on the type of strategies that realise
the equilibrium. It is natural to restrict the search space to profiles of pure, finite-state,
pure finite-state, stationary or positional strategies. We denote the corresponding decision
problems by PureNE, FinNE, PureFinNE, StatNE and PosNE, respectively. In the rest
of this paper, we are going to prove upper and lower bounds on the complexity of these
problems, where all lower bounds even hold for the qualitative variants of these problems.
Our first observation is that neither stationary nor pure strategies are sufficient to
implement any Nash equilibrium, even in SSMGs and even if we are only interested in
whether a player wins or loses almost surely in the equilibrium. Together with another result
from this section (Proposition 4.13), this demonstrates that the problems NE, PureNE,
FinNE, PureFinNE, StatNE and PosNE are distinct problems, which have to be analysed
separately. This is in sharp contrast to the situation for SS2Gs where all these problems
coincide because SS2Gs admit globally optimal positional strategies.
Proposition 4.1. There exists an SSMG with a stationary Nash equilibrium where player 0
wins almost surely, but with no pure Nash equilibrium where player 0 wins with positive
probability.
Proof. Consider the SSMG depicted in Fig. 3, played by three players 0, 1 and 2 (with
payoffs given in this order). Clearly, the stationary strategy profile where from vertex v2
player 0 selects both outgoing transitions with probability 1/2 each, player 1 plays from v0
to v1 and player 2 plays from v1 to v2 is a Nash equilibrium where player 0 wins almost
surely. However, for any pure strategy profile where player 0 wins with positive probability,
either player 1 or player 2 receives payoff 0 and could improve her payoff by switching her
strategy at v0 or v1, respectively.
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Figure 3. An SSMG with no pure Nash
equilibrium where player 0 wins with posi-
tive probability.
v0
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(0, 1, 0) v2
0
(0, 0, 1)
Figure 4. An SSMG with no stationary
Nash equilibrium where player 0 wins with
positive probability.
Proposition 4.2. There exists an SSMG with a pure finite-state Nash equilibrium where
player 0 wins almost surely, but with no stationary Nash equilibrium where player 0 wins
with positive probability.
Proof. Consider the (deterministic) SSMG G depicted in Fig. 4, also played by three players
0, 1 and 2. Clearly, the pure finite-state strategy profile that leads to the terminal vertex
with payoff (1, 0, 0) and where at v2 player 0 plays “right” if player 1 has played to v0
and “left” if player 2 has played to v0 is a Nash equilibrium of (G, v0). Now consider any
stationary equilibrium of (G, v0) where player 0 wins with positive probability. If at v2 the
stationary strategy of player 0 prescribes to play “right” with positive probability, then
player 2 can improve her payoff by playing to v2 with probability 1, and otherwise player 1
can improve her payoff by playing to v2 with probability 1, a contradiction.
4.1. Positional equilibria. In this subsection, we analyse the complexity of the (presum-
ably) simplest of the decision problems introduced so far, namely PosNE. Not surprisingly,
this problem is decidable; in fact, it is NP-complete for all types of objectives we consider
in this paper. Let us start by proving membership to NP. Since terminal reachability,
(co-)Büchi and parity objectives can easily be translated to Rabin or Streett objectives,
it suffices to consider Streett-Rabin and Muller SMGs.
Theorem 4.3. PosNE is in NP for Streett-Rabin SMGs and Muller SMGs.
Proof. To decide PosNE, on input G, v0, x, y, we can guess a positional strategy profile σ, i.e.
a mapping
⋃
i∈Π Vi → V ; then, we verify whether σ is a Nash equilibrium with the desired
payoff. To do this, we first compute the payoff zi of σ for each player i by computing
the probability of the event Wini in the (finite) Markov chain (Gσ , v0). Once each zi is
computed, we can easily check whether xi ≤ zi ≤ yi. To verify that σ is a Nash equilibrium,
we additionally compute, for each player i, the value ri of the (finite) MDP Gσ−i from v0.
Clearly, σ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if ri ≤ zi for each player i. Since we can compute
the value of an MDP (or a Markov chain) with a Streett, Rabin or Muller objective in
polynomial time (Theorem 2.9), all these checks can be carried out in polynomial time.
To establish NP-completeness, we still need to show NP-hardness. In fact, the reduction
we are going to present does not only work for PosNE, but also for StatNE, where we allow
arbitrary stationary equilibria.
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Theorem 4.4. PosNE and StatNE are NP-hard, even for SSMGs with only two players
(three players for the qualitative variants).
Proof. The proof is by reduction from SAT. Given a Boolean formula ϕ = C1 ∧ . . . ∧ Cm
in conjunctive normal form over propositional variables X1, . . . ,Xn, where without loss of
generality m ≥ 1 and each clause is non-empty, we show how to construct a two-player
SSMG (G, v0) such that the following statements are equivalent:
(1) ϕ is satisfiable.
(2) (G, v0) has a positional Nash equilibrium with payoff (1, 12).
(3) (G, v0) has a stationary Nash equilibrium with payoff (1, 12 ).
Provided that the game can be constructed in polynomial time, these equivalences establish
both reductions. The game G is depicted in Fig. 5. The game proceeds from the initial
vertex v0 toXi or ¬Xi with probability 1/2i+1 each, and to vertex ϕ with probability 1/2n+1;
with the remaining probability of 1/2n+1 the game proceeds to a terminal vertex with
payoff (1, 0). From ϕ, the game proceeds to each vertex Cj with probability 1/(m + 1);
with the remaining probability of 1/(m + 1), the game proceeds to a terminal vertex with
payoff (1, 1). From vertex Cj (controlled by player 1), there is a transition to a literal L, i.e.
L = Xi or L = ¬Xi, if and only if L occurs inside the clause Cj. Obviously, the game G can
be constructed from ϕ in polynomial time. We conclude the proof by showing that (1)–(3)
are equivalent.
(1⇒ 2) Assume that α : {X1, . . . ,Xn} → {true, false} is a satisfying assignment of ϕ. Con-
sider the positional strategy profile where player 0 moves from a literal L to the neighbouring
⊤-labelled vertex if and only if L is mapped to true by α, and player 1 moves from ver-
tex Cj to a literal L that is contained in Cj and mapped to true by α (which is possible
since α is a satisfying assignment); at ⊤-labelled vertices, player 1 never plays to a terminal
vertex. Obviously, player 0 wins almost surely in this strategy profile. In order to compute
player 1’s payoff, note that for each variable X player 1 either receives payoff 1 from X and
payoff 0 from ¬X, or she receives payoff 1 from ¬X and payoff 0 from X (because player 0
plays according to a well-defined assignment). Moreover, player 1 wins almost surely from ϕ
since that assignment satisfies ϕ. Hence, player 1’s payoff equals
1
2n+1
+
n∑
i=1
1
2i+1
=
1
2n+1
+
1
2
( n∑
i=1
1
2i
)
=
1
2n+1
+
1
2
(
1− 1
2n
)
=
1
2
,
Obviously, changing her strategy cannot give player 1 a better payoff. Therefore, we have
identified a Nash equilibrium.
(2⇒ 3) Trivial.
(3⇒ 1) Let σ = (σ0, σ1) be a stationary Nash equilibrium of (G, v0) with payoff (1, 12 ). Our
first aim is to show that σ0 is actually a positional strategy. Consider any literal L such
that σ0(L) assigns probability q > 0 to the neighbouring ⊤-labelled vertex. Since player 0
wins almost surely, we know that player 1 never plays to a terminal vertex with payoff
(0, 1). Hence, the expected payoff for player 1 from L equals q. However, by playing to a
terminal vertex with payoff (0, 1), player 1 can get payoff 2q/(1 + q) from L. Since σ is a
Nash equilibrium, we have 2q/(1 + q) ≤ q, which implies that q = 1.
Now we define a pseudo assignment α : {X1,¬X1, . . . ,Xn,¬Xn} → {true, false} by
setting α(L) = true if and only if σ0 prescribes to go from vertex L to the neighbouring
⊤-labelled vertex. Our next aim is to show that α is actually an assignment: α(Xi) = true
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Figure 5. Reducing SAT to PosNE and StatNE.
if and only if α(¬Xi) = false. To see this, note that we can compute player 1’s expected
payoff from v0 as follows:
1
2
=
p
2n+1
+
n∑
i=1
ai
2i+1
, ai =


0 if α(Xi) = α(¬Xi) = false,
1 if α(Xi) 6= α(¬Xi),
2 if α(Xi) = α(¬Xi) = true,
where p is the expected payoff for player 1 from vertex ϕ. By the construction of G, we have
p > 0, and the equality only holds if p = 1 and ai = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n, which proves that
α is an assignment.
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Finally, we claim that α satisfies ϕ. If this were not the case, there would exist a
clause C such that player 1’s expected payoff from vertex C equals 0, and therefore p < 1.
This is a contradiction to p = 1, as we have shown above.
To show that the qualitative variants of PosNE and StatNE are also NP-hard, it suffices
to modify the game G as follows: First, we add one new player, player 2, who wins at
precisely those terminal vertices where player 1 loses. Second, we add two new vertices
v1 and v2. At v1, player 1 has the choice to leave the game; if she decides to stay inside
the game, the play proceeds to v2, where player 2 has the choice to leave the game; if she
also decides to stay inside the game, the play proceeds to vertex v0 from where the game
continues normally; if player 1 or player 2 decides to leave the game, then each of them
receives payoff 12 , but player 0 receives payoff 0. Let us denote the modified game by G′.
It is straightforward to see that the following statements are equivalent:
(1) (G′, v1) has a stationary Nash equilibrium where player 0 wins almost surely.
(2) (G, v0) has a stationary Nash equilibrium with payoff (1, 12 ).
(3) ϕ is satisfiable.
(4) (G, v0) has a positional Nash equilibrium with payoff (1, 12).
(5) (G′, v1) has a positional Nash equilibrium where player 0 wins almost surely.
4.2. Stationary equilibria. To prove the decidability of StatNE, we appeal to results
established for the existential theory of the reals, the set of all existential first-order sen-
tences (over the appropriate signature) that hold in the ordered field R := (R,+, ·, 0, 1,≤).
The best known upper bound for the complexity of the associated decision problem is
Pspace [12], which leads to the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5. StatNE is in Pspace for Streett-Rabin SMGs and Muller SMGs.
Proof. Since Pspace = NPspace, it suffices to provide a nondeterministic algorithm with
polynomial space requirements for deciding StatNE. On input G, v0, x, y, where without
loss of generality G is an SMG with Muller objectives given by Fi ⊆ P(C), the algorithm
starts by guessing the support S ⊆ V × V of a stationary strategy profile σ of G, i.e.
S = {(v,w) ∈ V × V : σ(w | v) > 0}. From the set S alone, by standard graph algorithms,
one can compute for each player i the following sets in polynomial time (see [4, Chapter 10]):
(1) the union Fi of all bottom SCCs U of the Markov chain Gσ with χ(U) ∈ Fi,
(2) the set Ri of vertices v such that Pr
σ
v (Reach(Fi)) > 0,
(3) the union Ti of all end components U of the MDP Gσ−i with χ(U) ∈ Fi.
After computing all these sets, the algorithm evaluates an existential first-order sen-
tence ψ, which can be computed in polynomial time from G, v0, x, y, S, (Ri)i∈Π, (Fi)i∈Π
and (Ti)i∈Π, over R and returns the answer to this query.
How does ψ look like? Let α = (αvw)v,w∈V , r = (r
i
v)i∈Π,v∈V and z = (z
i
v)i∈Π,v∈V be
three sets of variables, and let V∗ =
⋃
i∈Π Vi. The formula
ϕ(α) :=
∧
v∈V∗
( ∧
w∈v∆
αvw ≥ 0 ∧
∧
w∈V \v∆
αvw = 0 ∧
∑
w∈v∆
αvw = 1
)
∧
∧
v∈V \V∗
w∈V
αvw = ∆(w | v) ∧
∧
(v,w)∈S
αvw > 0 ∧
∧
(v,w)/∈S
αvw = 0
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states that the mapping σ : V → [0, 1]V , defined by σ(v)(w) = αvw, constitutes a valid sta-
tionary strategy profile of G whose support is S. Provided that ϕ(α) holds in R, the formula
ηi(α, z) :=
∧
v∈Fi
ziv = 1 ∧
∧
v∈V \Ri
ziv = 0 ∧
∧
v∈V \Fi
ziv =
∑
w∈v∆
αvw · ziw
states that ziv = Pr
σ
v (Wini) for each v ∈ V , where σ is defined as above. This follows from
a well-known result about Markov chains, namely that the vector of the aforementioned
probabilities is the unique solution of the given system of equations (see [4, Chapter 10]).
Finally, the formula
ϑi(α, r) :=
∧
v∈V
riv ≥ 0 ∧
∧
v∈Ti
riv = 1 ∧
∧
v∈Vi
w∈v∆
riv ≥ riw ∧
∧
v∈V \Vi
riv =
∑
w∈v∆
αvw · riw
states that riv ≥ supτ Prσ−i,τv (Wini) for all v ∈ V (see [4, Chapter 10]).
The desired sentence ψ is the existential closure of the conjunction of ϕ and, for each
player i, the formulae ηi and ϑi combined with formulae stating that player i cannot improve
her payoff and that the expected payoff for player i lies in between the given thresholds:
ψ := ∃α∃r ∃z
(
ϕ(α) ∧
∧
i∈Π
(ηi(α, z) ∧ ϑi(α, r) ∧ riv0 ≤ ziv0 ∧ xi ≤ ziv0 ≤ yi)
)
.
Clearly, ψ holds in R if and only if (G, v0) has a stationary Nash equilibrium with payoff at
least x and at most y whose support is S. Consequently, the algorithm is correct.
In Section 4.1, we showed that StatNE is NP-hard, leaving a considerable gap to our
upper bound of Pspace. Towards gaining a better understanding, we relate StatNE to the
square root sum problem (SqrtSum) of deciding, given numbers d1, . . . , dn, k ∈ N, whether∑n
i=1
√
di ≥ k.
Recently, Allender et al. [1] showed that SqrtSum belongs to the fourth level of the
counting hierarchy, a slight improvement over the previously known Pspace upper bound.
However, it has been an open question since the 1970s as to whether SqrtSum falls into
the polynomial hierarchy [34, 30]. We identify a polynomial-time reduction from SqrtSum
to StatNE for SSMGs.1 Hence, StatNE is at least as hard as SqrtSum, and showing that
StatNE resides inside the polynomial hierarchy would imply a major breakthrough in un-
derstanding the complexity of numerical computation.
Theorem 4.6. SqrtSum is polynomial-time reducible to StatNE, even for 4-player SSMGs.
Before we start with the proof of the theorem, let us first examine the game G(p), where
0 ≤ p ≤ 1, played by players 0, 1, 2 and 3 and depicted in Fig. 7.
Lemma 4.7. The maximal payoff player 3 receives in a stationary Nash equilibrium of
(G(p), s1) where player 0 wins almost surely equals √p.
Proof. In the following, assume without loss of generality that 0 < p < 1 (otherwise the
statement is trivial), and define q := 1−p. For any stationary strategy profile σ of G(p) where
player 0 wins almost surely, let x1 = σ0(s2 | t1) and x2 = σ0(s1 | t2) be the probabilities
1Some authors define SqrtSum using ≤ instead of ≥. With this definition, we would reduce from the
complement of SqrtSum instead.
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Figure 6. Reducing SqrtSum
to StatNE.
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Figure 7. The game G(p).
that player 0 “stays inside the game” at t1, respectively t2. Given x1 and x2, for i = 1, 2
we can compute the payoff fi(x1, x2) := Pr
σ
si(Wini) for player i from si by
fi(x1, x2) =
p/2 + q(1− xi)
1− q2x1x2 .
To have a Nash equilibrium, it must be the case that f1(x1, x2), f2(x1, x2) ≥ 12 since other-
wise player 1 or player 2 would prefer to leave the game at s1 or s2, respectively, which would
give the respective player payoff 12 immediately. Vice versa, if f1(x1, x2), f2(x1, x2) ≥ 12 then
σ is a Nash equilibrium with expected payoff
f(x1, x2) :=
p+ qx1p
1− q2x1x2
for player 3. Hence, to determine the maximum payoff for player 3 in a stationary Nash
equilibrium where player 0 wins almost surely, we have to maximise f(x1, x2) under the
constraints f1(x1, x2), f2(x1, x2) ≥ 12 and 0 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 1. We claim that the maximum is
reached only if x1 = x2. If e.g. x1 > x2, then we can achieve a higher payoff for player 3 by
setting x′2 := x1, and the constraints are still satisfied:
p/2 + q(1− x′2)
1− q2x1x′2
=
p/2 + q(1− x1)
1− q2x21
≥ p/2 + q(1− x1)
1− q2x1x2 ≥
1
2
.
Hence, it suffices to maximise f(x, x) subject to f1(x, x) ≥ 12 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, which is
equivalent to maximising f(x, x) subject to (1−p)x2−2x+1 ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. The roots
of the polynomial are (1±√p)/(1− p), but (1 +√p)/(1− p) > 1 for p > 0. Therefore, any
solution x must satisfy x ≤ x0 := (1 − √p)/(1 − p). Since 0 ≤ x0 ≤ 1 for 0 < p < 1 and
f(x, x) is strictly increasing on [0, 1], the optimal solution is x0, and the maximal payoff for
player 3 in a stationary Nash equilibrium of (G(p), s1) where player 0 wins almost surely
equals indeed
f(x0, x0) =
p+ qx0p
1− q2x20
=
p
1− qx0 =
p
1− (1− p)x0 =
p
1− (1−√p) =
√
p . 
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Proof of Theorem 4.6. Given an instance (d1, . . . , dn, k) of SqrtSum, where without loss of
generality n > 0, di > 0 for each i = 1, . . . , n, and d :=
∑n
i=1 di, we construct a 4-player
SSMG (G, v0) such that (G, v0) has a stationary Nash equilibrium where player 0 wins almost
surely if and only if
∑n
i=1
√
di ≥ k. Define pi := di/d2 for i = 1, . . . , n. For the reduction, we
use n copies of the game G(p), where in the ith copy we set p to pi. The complete game G is
depicted in Fig. 6. By Lemma 4.7, the maximal payoff player 3 receives in a stationary Nash
equilibrium of (G(pi), s1) where player 0 wins almost surely equals √pi =
√
di/d. Hence, the
maximal payoff player 3 receives in a stationary Nash equilibrium of (G, v1) where player 0
wins almost surely equals
n∑
i=1
1
n
·
√
di
d
=
1
dn
·
n∑
i=1
√
di .
If
∑n
i=1
√
di ≥ k, then we can extend such an equilibrium to a stationary Nash equilibrium
of (G, v0) where player 0 wins almost surely by letting player 3 play from v0 to v1 with
probability 1. On the other hand, if
∑n
i=1
√
di < k, then in any stationary Nash equilibrium
of (G, v0) player 3 plays to v1 with probability 0, and player 0 loses almost surely.
Remark 4.8. The positive results of Sections 4.1 and 4.2 can easily be extended to equilibria
in pure or randomised strategies with a memory of a fixed size k ∈ N: a nondeterministic
algorithm can guess a memory M of size k and then look for a positional, respectively
stationary, equilibrium in the product of the original game G with the memory M. Hence,
for any fixed k ∈ N, we can decide in Pspace (NP) the existence of a randomised (pure)
equilibrium of size k with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y.
4.3. Pure and randomised equilibria. In this section, we show that the problems NE
and PureNE are undecidable, by exhibiting a reduction from an undecidable problem about
two-counter machines. Our construction is inspired by a construction used by Brázdil
et al. [10] to prove the undecidability of stochastic games with branching-time objectives
(see Remark 4.12 below).
Let Γ := {inc(j),dec(j), zero(j) : j = 1, 2} (the set of instructions). A two-counter
machine is of the form M = (Q, q0, δ), where
− Q is a finite set of states,
− q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, and
− δ ⊆ Q× Γ×Q is the transition relation.
For q ∈ Q let δ(q) := {(γ, q′) ∈ Γ × Q : (q, γ, q′) ∈ δ}. We call M deterministic if for
each q ∈ Q either δ(q) = ∅, or δ(q) = {(inc(j), q′)} for some j ∈ {1, 2} and q′ ∈ Q, or
δ(q) = {(zero(j), q1), (dec(j), q2)} for some j ∈ {1, 2} and q1, q2 ∈ Q.
A configuration ofM is a triple C = (q, i1, i2) ∈ Q×N×N, where q denotes the current
state and ij denotes the current value of counter j. A configuration C
′ = (q′, i′1, i
′
2) is a
successor of configuration C = (q, i1, i2), denoted by C ⊢ C ′, if there exists a “matching”
transition (q, γ, q′) ∈ δ. For example, (q, i1, i2) ⊢ (q′, i1+1, i2) if and only if (q, inc(1), q′) ∈ δ.
The instruction zero(j) performs a zero test: (q, i1, i2) ⊢ (q′, i1, i2) if and only if i1 = 0 and
(q, zero(1), q′) ∈ δ, or i2 = 0 and (q, zero(2), q′) ∈ δ.
A partial computation ofM is a finite or infinite sequence ρ = ρ(0)ρ(1) . . . of configura-
tions such that ρ(0) ⊢ ρ(1) ⊢ · · · and ρ(0) = (q0, 0, 0) (the initial configuration). A partial
computation of M is a computation of M if it is infinite or ends in a configuration C for
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which there for which there exists no successor configuration. Note that each deterministic
two-counter machine has a unique computation.
The halting problem is to decide, given a machine M, whether M has a finite com-
putation. It is well-known that deterministic two-counter machines are Turing powerful,
which makes the halting problem and its dual, the non-halting problem, undecidable, even
when restricted to deterministic two-counter machines. In fact, the non-halting problem for
deterministic two-counter machines is not recursively enumerable.
Theorem 4.9. NE and PureNE are not recursively enumerable, even for 10-player SSMGs.
To prove Theorem 4.9, we give a reduction from the non-halting problem for determinis-
tic two-counter machines. Our aim is thus to compute from a machineM a 10-player SSMG
(G, v0) such that the computation of M is infinite if and only if (G, v0) has a (pure) Nash
equilibrium in which player 0 wins almost surely. Without loss of generality, we assume
that in M there is no zero test that is followed by another zero test: if (zero(j), q′) ∈ δ(q),
then |δ(q′)| ≤ 1.
The game G is played by players 0, 1 and eight other players Atj and Btj , indexed by
j ∈ {1, 2} and t ∈ {0, 1}. Intuitively, player 0 and player 1 build up the computation of M:
player 0 updates the counters, and player 1 chooses transitions. The other players make
sure that player 0 updates the counters correctly: players A0j and A
1
j ensure that, in each
step, the value of counter j is not too high, and players B0j and B
1
j ensure that, in each
step, the value of counter j is not too low. More precisely, A0j and B
0
j monitor the odd steps
of the computation, while A1j and B
1
j monitor the even steps.
Let Γ′ := Γ ∪ {init}. For each q ∈ Q, each γ ∈ Γ′, each j ∈ {1, 2} and each t ∈ {0, 1},
the game G contains the gadgets Stγ,q, Itq and Ctγ,j, which are depicted in Fig. 8. For better
readability, terminal vertices are depicted as squares; the label indicates which players win.
The initial vertex of G is v0 := v0init,q0. Note that in the gadget Stγ,q, each of the players Atj
and Btj may quit the game, which gives her a payoff of
1
3 or
1
6 , respectively, but payoff 0 to
players 0 and 1.
It will turn out that player 1 will play a pure strategy in any Nash equilibrium of (G, v0)
where player 0 wins almost surely, except possibly for histories that are not consistent with
the equilibrium. Formally, we say that a strategy profile σ of (G, v0) is safe if for all
histories xv consistent with σ and ending in a vertex v ∈ Itq there exists w ∈ V with
σ1(w | xv) = 1.
For any safe strategy profile σ of G where player 0 wins almost surely, let x0v0 ≺
x1v1 ≺ x2v2 ≺ · · · (where xi ∈ V ∗, vi ∈ V and x0 = ε) be the unique sequence containing
all histories xv of (G, v0) that are consistent with σ and end in a vertex v of the form v = vtγ,q.
This sequence is infinite because player 0 wins almost surely. Additionally, let q0, q1, . . .
and γ0, γ1, . . . be the corresponding sequences of states and instructions, respectively, i.e.
vn = v
0
γn,qn or vn = v
1
γn,qn for all n ∈ N. For each j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈ N, we set:
anj := Pr
σ
v0(player A
n mod 2
j wins | xnvn · V ω) ;
bnj := Pr
σ
v0(player B
n mod 2
j wins | xnvn · V ω) .
Note that at every terminal vertex of the counter gadgets Ctγ,j and C
1−t
γ,j either player A
t
j
or player Btj wins. For each j, the conditional probability that, given the history xnvn, we
reach such a vertex is
∑
k∈N 1/2
k · 14 = 12 . Hence, anj = 12 − bnj for all n ∈ N. We say that
σ is stable if anj =
1
3 or, equivalently, b
n
j =
1
6 for each j ∈ {1, 2} and for all n ∈ N.
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Stγ,q :
vtγ,qA
t
1
At1, A
t
2
At2
Bt1
Bt1, B
t
2
Bt2
Ctγ,1
Ctγ,2
Itq
1
3
2
3
1
6
5
6
1
2
1
4
1
4
Itq for δ(q) = {(inc(j), q
′)}:
1
S1−t
inc(j),q′
Itq for δ(q) = {(zero(j), q1), (dec(j), q2)}:
1 S
1−t
zero(j),q1
S1−t
dec(j),q2
Itq for δ(q) = ∅:
Ctγ,j for γ /∈ {init, inc(j),dec(j), zero(j)}:
0
0, Atj , A
1−t
j
0, Atj , B
1−t
j
0, Btj , B
1−t
j
0, Atj , B
1−t
j
Ctγ,j for γ = inc(j):
0
0, Atj , A
1−t
j
0, Atj , A
1−t
j
0, Btj , A
1−t
j
0, Atj , B
1−t
j
Ctγ,j for γ = dec(j):
0
0, Atj , B
1−t
j
0, Atj , A
1−t
j
0, Btj , B
1−t
j
0, Atj , B
1−t
j
Ctγ,j for γ ∈ {init, zero(j)}:
0, 1, Atj , A
1−t
j 0, 1, A
t
j , B
1−t
j
0, 1, Btj , B
1−t
j
Figure 8. Simulating a two-counter machine.
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Finally, for each j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈ N, we define a number cnj ∈ [0, 1] as follows:
After the history xnvn, with probability
1
4 the play enters the counter gadget C
n mod 2
γn,j . The
number cnj is defined as the probability of subsequently reaching a grey-coloured vertex.
Note that, by the construction of G, it holds that cnj = 1 if γn = zero(j) or γn = init;
in particular, c01 = c
0
2 = 1.
Lemma 4.10. Let σ be a safe strategy profile of (G, v0) in which player 0 wins almost
surely. Then σ is stable if and only if
cn+1j =


1
2 · cnj if γn+1 = inc(j),
2 · cnj if γn+1 = dec(j),
cnj = 1 if γn+1 = zero(j),
cnj otherwise,
(4.1)
for each j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈ N.
To prove the lemma, consider a safe strategy profile σ of (G, v0) in which player 0 wins
almost surely. For each j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈ N, set
pnj := Pr
σ
v0(player A
n mod 2
j wins | xnvn · V ω \ xn+2vn+2 · V ω) .
The following claim relates the numbers anj and p
n
j .
Claim. Let j ∈ {1, 2}. Then anj = 13 for all n ∈ N if and only if pnj = 14 for all n ∈ N.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that anj = 13 for all n ∈ N. We have anj = pnj + 14 · an+2j and therefore
1
3 = p
n
j +
1
12 for all n ∈ N. Hence, pnj = 14 for all n ∈ N.
(⇐) Assume that pnj = 14 for all n ∈ N. Since anj = pnj + 14 · an+2j for all n ∈ N, the
numbers anj must satisfy the following recurrence: a
n+2
j = 4a
n
j −1. Since all the numbers anj
are probabilities, 0 ≤ anj ≤ 1 for all n ∈ N. It is easy to see that the only values for a0j
and a1j such that 0 ≤ anj ≤ 1 for all n ∈ N are a0j = a1j = 13 . But this implies that anj = 13
for all n ∈ N.
Proof of Lemma 4.10. By the previous claim, we only need to show that pnj =
1
4 if and only
if (4.1) holds. Let j ∈ {1, 2}, n ∈ N and t = n mod 2. The probability pnj can be expressed
as the sum of the probability that the play reaches a terminal vertex that is winning for
player Atj inside C
t
γn,j and the probability that the play reaches such a vertex inside C
1−t
γn+1,j
.
The first probability does not depend on γn, but the second depends on γn+1. Let us
consider the case that γn+1 = inc(j). In this case,
pnj =
1
4 ·
(
1− 14 · cnj
)
+ 18 · cn+1j = 14 − 116 · cnj + 18 · cn+1j .
Obviously, this sum is equal to 14 if and only if c
n+1
j =
1
2 · cnj . For any other value of γn+1,
the argumentation is similar.
To establish the reduction, we need to show that the following statements are equivalent:
(1) the computation of M is infinite;
(2) (G, v0) has a pure Nash equilibrium in which player 0 wins almost surely;
(3) (G, v0) has a Nash equilibrium in which player 0 wins almost surely.
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(1⇒ 2) Assume that the computation ρ = ρ(0)ρ(1) . . . of M is infinite. We define a
pure strategy profile σ as follows: (1) For a history that ends at the unique vertex v ∈ Ctγ,j
controlled by player 0 after visiting a vertex of the form vtγ′,q or v
1−t
γ′,q exactly n > 0 times
and v exactly k ≥ 0 times, player 0 plays to the grey-coloured successor vertex if k is greater
than or equal to the value of counter j in configuration ρ(n−1); otherwise, player 0 plays to
the other successor vertex. (2) For a history that ends in one of the instruction gadgets Itq
for δ(q) = {(zero(j), q1), (dec(j), q2)} after visiting a vertex of the form vtγ,q′ or v1−tγ,q′ exactly
n > 0 times, player 1 plays to S1−tzero(j),q1 if the value of counter j in configuration ρ(n− 1) is
zero and to S1−tdec(j),q2 if the value of counter j in configuration ρ(n− 1) is not zero. (3) Any
other player’s pure strategy is defined as follows: after a history ending in Stγ,q, the strategy
prescribes to quit the game if and only if the history is not compatible with ρ (i.e. if the
corresponding sequence of instructions does not match ρ).
Note that the resulting strategy profile σ is safe. Moreover, since the players follows
the computation of M, a terminal vertex inside one of the counter gadgets Ctγ,j is reached
with probability 1 in σ. Hence, player 0 wins almost surely. Moreover, by the definition
of σ, (4.1) holds, and we can conclude from Lemma 4.10 that σ is stable. We claim that
σ is, in fact, a Nash equilibrium of (G, v0): It is obvious that player 0 cannot improve her
payoff. If player 1 deviates, we reach a history that is not compatible with ρ. Hence, player
A01 or A
0
2 will quit the game, which ensures that player 1 will not receive a higher payoff.
Finally, since σ is stable, none of the players Atj or B
t
j can improve her payoff.
(2⇒ 3) Trivial.
(3⇒ 1) Assume that σ is a Nash equilibrium of (G, v0) in which player 0 wins almost
surely. In order to apply Lemma 4.10, we first prove that σ is safe. By contradiction,
assume that there exists a history xv consistent with σ and ending in a vertex v ∈ Itq
such that σ1(xv) assigns positive probability to two distinct successor vertices. Hence,
δ(q) = {(zero(j), q1), (dec(j), q2)} for some j ∈ {1, 2} and q1, q2 ∈ Q. By our assumption
that there are no consecutive zero tests and since player 0 wins almost surely,
Prσv0(player 1 wins | xv · v1−tzero(j),q1 · V ω) ≥ 14 ,
but
Prσv0(player 1 wins | xv · v1−tdec(j),q2 · V ω) ≤ 16 .
Hence, player 1 could improve her payoff by playing to v1−tzero(j),q1 with probability 1, a con-
tradiction to σ being a Nash equilibrium.
To apply Lemma 4.10 and obtain (4.1), it remains to be shown that σ is stable. In order
to derive a contradiction, assume that there exists j ∈ {1, 2} and n ∈ N such that either
anj <
1
3 or a
n
j >
1
3 (i.e. b
n
j <
1
6). In the former case, player A
n mod 2
j could improve her
payoff by quitting the game after history xnvn, while in the latter case, player B
n mod 2
j
could improve her payoff by quitting the game, again a contradiction to σ being a Nash
equilibrium.
From c0j = 1 and (4.1), it follows that each c
n
j is of the form c
n
j = 1/2
i where i ∈ N. We
denote by inj the unique number i such that c
n
j = 1/2
i and set ρ(n) = (qn, i
n
1 , i
n
2 ) for each
n ∈ N. We claim that ρ := ρ(0)ρ(1) . . . is in fact the computation ofM. In particular, this
computation is infinite. It suffices to verify the following two properties:
− ρ(0) = (q0, 0, 0);
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− ρ(n) ⊢ ρ(n+ 1) for all n ∈ N.
The first property is immediate. To prove the second property, let ρ(n) = (q, i1, i2) and
ρ(n+ 1) = (q′, i′1, i
′
2). Hence, vn lies inside S
t
γ,q, and vn+1 lies inside S
1−t
γ′,q′ for suitable γ, γ
′
and t = n mod 2. We only prove the claim for δ(q) = {(zero(1), q1), (dec(1), q2)}; the other
cases are similar. Note that, by the construction of the gadget Itq, it must be the case that
either q′ = q1 and γ
′ = zero(1), or q′ = q2 and γ
′ = dec(1). By (4.1), if γ′ = zero(1), then
i′1 = i1 = 0 and i
′
2 = i2, and if γ
′ = dec(1), then i′1 = i1 − 1 and i′2 = i2. This implies
ρ(n) ⊢ ρ(n+ 1): on the one hand, if i1 = 0, then i′1 6= i1 − 1, which implies γ′ 6= dec(1) and
thus γ′ = zero(1), q′ = q1 and i
′
1 = i1 = 0; on the other hand, if i1 > 0, then γ
′ 6= zero(1)
and thus γ′ = dec(1), q′ = q2 and i
′
1 = i1 − 1.
Remark 4.11. For the problem PureNE, we can strengthen Theorem 4.9 slightly by showing
undecidability already for 9-player SSMGs. This can be achieved by merging player 0 and
player 1 in the game described in the proof of Theorem 4.9.
Remark 4.12. The proof of Theorem 4.9 can also be viewed as a proof for the undecidability
of a problem about the logic PCTL (probabilistic computation tree logic), introduced by
Hansson and Jonsson [38]. PCTL is evaluated over labelled Markov chains and replaces the
universal and existential path quantifiers of CTL by a family of probabilistic quantifiers P∼x,
where ∼ is a comparison operator and x ∈ [0, 1] is a rational probability. For example, the
formula P=1/2FQ holds in state v if (and only if) the probability of reaching a state labelled
with Q from v equals 12 .
Brázdil et al. [10] proved the undecidability of the following problem: given a labelled
Markov decision process (G, v0) and a PCTL formula ϕ, decide whether the controller has
a strategy σ such that the Markov chain (Gσ, v0) is a model of ϕ. We can prove a stronger
result, namely that there exists a fixed PCTL formula ϕ, which only contains the quantifiers
P=xF and P=xG, for which the problem is undecidable. It suffices to add propositions A01,
A11, A
0
2, A
1
2, Q, Q1, Q2, T , Z0 and Z1 according to the following rules:
(1) if v is a terminal vertex that is winning for player A ∈ {A01, A11, A02, A12}, then label v
with A;
(2) If v is controlled by player 0 and |v∆| = 2, then label v with Q and label one of its
successors with Q1 and the other with Q2.
(3) if v is a terminal vertex that is winning for player 0, then label v with T ;
(4) if v = v0γ,q, then label v with Z0; if v = v
1
γ,q, then label v with Z1.
To obtain an MDP, we make all non-stochastic vertices controlled by player 0. Finally, the
PCTL formula for which we prove undecidability is
P=1FT ∧
∧
t=0,1
P=1G
(
Zt →
∧
j=1,2
P=1/3FAtj
)
∧ P=1G
(
Q→
∨
i=0,1
P=1FQi
)
.
The first part of the formula states that player 0 wins almost surely, the second part requires
the strategy to be stable, and the last part of the formula requires the strategy to be safe.
4.4. Finite-state equilibria. We can use the construction in the proof of Theorem 4.9 to
show that Nash equilibria may require infinite memory, even if we are only interested in
whether a player wins with probability 0 or 1.
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Proposition 4.13. There exists a finite SSMG that has a pure Nash equilibrium where
player 0 wins almost surely, but that has no finite-state Nash equilibrium where player 0
wins with positive probability.
Proof. Consider the game (G, v0) constructed in the proof of Theorem 4.9 for the machineM
with the single transition (q0, inc(1), q0). We modify this game by adding a new initial
vertex v1 which is controlled by a new player, player 2, and from where she can either move
to v0 or to a new terminal vertex where she receives payoff 1 and every other player receives
payoff 0. Additionally, player 2 wins at every terminal vertex of the game G that is winning
for player 0. Let us denote the modified game by G′.
Since the computation of M is infinite, the game (G, v0) has a pure Nash equilib-
rium where player 0 wins almost surely. This equilibrium induces a pure Nash equilibrium
of (G′, v1) where both player 0 and player 2 win almost surely.
Now assume that there exists a finite-state Nash equilibrium of (G′, v1) where player 0
wins with positive probability. Such an equilibrium induces a finite-state Nash equilibrium σ
of (G, v0) where player 2, and thus also player 0, wins almost surely; otherwise, player 2
would prefer to play from v1 to the new terminal vertex. Using the same notation as in the
proof of Theorem 4.9, it follows from Lemma 4.10 that cn1 = 1/2
n for each n ∈ N. But this
is impossible if σ is a finite-state strategy profile.
Propositions 4.1 and 4.13 imply that the decision problems NE, FinNE, PureNE and
PureFinNE are pairwise distinct. Another way to see that PureNE and PureFinNE are dis-
tinct is to observe that PureFinNE is recursively enumerable: to decide whether an SMG
(G, v0) has a pure finite-state Nash equilibrium with payoff ≥ x and ≤ y, one can just
enumerate all possible pure finite-state profiles σ and check for each of them whether it
constitutes a Nash equilibrium with the desired properties by analysing the finite Markov
chain Gσ and the finite MDPs Gσ−i . Hence, to prove that PureFinNE is undecidable, we
cannot reduce from the non-halting problem. Instead, we reduce from the halting prob-
lem (which is recursively enumerable itself). The same reduction proves that FinNE is
undecidable.
Theorem 4.14. FinNE and PureFinNE are undecidable, even for 14-player SSMGs.
Proof sketch. The construction is similar to the one for proving the undecidability of NE.
Given a two-counter machine M, we modify the SSMG G constructed in the proof of The-
orem 4.9 by adding another counter (together with four more players for checking whether
the counter is updated correctly) that has to be incremented in each step. Moreover, the
gadget Iγ,q for δ(q) = ∅ is replaced by the gadget shown in Fig. 9, and a new instruction halt
is added, together with a suitable gadget Cthalt,j, also depicted in Fig. 9. Let us denote the
new game by G′. If M does not halt, any Nash equilibrium of (G′, v0) where player 0 wins
with probability 1 needs infinite memory: to win almost surely, player 0 must follow the
computation of M and increment the new counter at each step, which requires infinite
memory. On the other hand, if M halts, there exists a pure finite-state Nash equilibrium
of (G′, v0) in which player 0 wins almost surely. (The arguments for the existence of such
an equilibrium are the same as in the proof of Theorem 4.9; sinceM halts, the equilibrium
can be implemented with finite memory).
Remark 4.15. With the same reasoning as for PureNE, we can eliminate one player in the
reduction for PureFinNE. Hence, this problem is already undecidable for SSMGs with
13 players.
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Itq for δ(q) = ∅:
C1−thalt,1
C1−thalt,2
0, A1−t1 , A
1−t
2
0, At1, A
t
2,
B1−t1 , B
1−t
2
0, Bt1, B
t
2,
A1−t1 , A
1−t
2
1
2
1
4
1
4
2
3
1
3
Ctγ,j for γ = halt:
0
0, A1−tj
0, B1−tj
0, B1−tj
Figure 9. Reducing from the halting problem.
5. The strictly qualitative fragment
In this section, we prove that the fragment of NE that arises from restricting the thresholds
to be the same binary payoff (i.e. each entry is either 0 or 1) is decidable for games with
ω-regular objectives; we denote this problem by StrQualNE. Formally, StrQualNE is defined
as follows:
Given an SMG (G, v0) and x ∈ {0, 1}Π, decide whether (G, v0) has a Nash
equilibrium with payoff x.
To prove decidability, we first characterise the existence of a Nash equilibrium with a binary
payoff in games with prefix-independent objectives.
5.1. Characterisation of existence. Given an SMG G and a player i, we denote by Wi
the set of all vertices v ∈ V such that valGi (v) > 0.
Proposition 5.1. Let (G, v0) be any SMG with prefix-independent objectives, and let
x ∈ {0, 1}Π. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(1) (G, v0) has a Nash equilibrium with payoff x;
(2) there exists a strategy profile σ of (G, v0) with payoff x such that Prσv0(Reach(Wi)) = 0
for each player i with xi = 0;
(3) there exists a pure strategy profile σ of (G, v0) with payoff x such that Prσv0(Reach(Wi)) =
0 for each player i with xi = 0;
(4) (G, v0) has a pure Nash equilibrium with payoff x.
If additionally all objectives are ω-regular, then each of the above statements is equivalent
to each of the following statements:
(5) There exists a pure finite-state strategy profile σ with payoff x such that
Prσv0(Reach(Wi)) = 0 for each player i with xi = 0.
(6) (G, v0) has a pure finite-state Nash equilibrium with payoff x.
Proof. (1⇒ 2) Let σ be a Nash equilibrium of (G, v0) with payoff x. We claim that σ is
already the strategy profile we are looking for: Prσv0(Reach(Wi)) = 0 for each player i with
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xi = 0. Let i ∈ Π be a player with xi = 0. By Lemma 3.3 and since Wini is prefix-
independent, we have 0 = Prσv0(Wini | xv · V ω) ≥ valGi (v) for all histories xv that are
consistent with σ. Hence, v ∈ V \Wi for all such histories xv, and Prσv0(Reach(Wi)) = 0.
(2⇒ 3) Let σ be a strategy profile of (G, v0) with payoff x such that Prσv0(Reach(Wi)) = 0
for each player i with xi = 0. Consider the MDP M that is obtained from G by removing
all vertices v ∈ V such that v ∈ Wi for some player i with xi = 0, merging all players into
one, and imposing the objective
Win =
⋂
i∈Π
xi=1
Wini ∩
⋂
i∈Π
xi=0
Cω \Wini .
The MDP M is well-defined since its domain is a subarena of G. Moreover, the value
valM(v0) of M from v0 equals 1 because the strategy profile σ induces a strategy σ in M
satisfying Prσv0(Win) = 1. Since each of the objectives Wini is prefix-independent, so is the
objective Win. Hence, by Theorem 2.5, (M, v0) admits an optimal pure strategy τ . Since
valM(v0) = 1, we have Pr
τ
v0(Win) = 1, and τ induces a pure strategy profile of (G, v0) with
the desired properties.
(3⇒ 4) Consider any pure strategy profile σ of (G, v0) with payoff x such that
Prσv0(Reach(Wi)) = 0 for each player i with xi = 0. We show that σ is favourable:
Prσv0(Wini | xv ·V ω) ≥ valGi (v) for each player i and each history xv of (G, v0) that is consis-
tent with σ. There are two cases: If xi = 1, then Pr
σ
v0(Wini | xv ·V ω) = 1 for all histories xv
consistent with σ, and the inequality holds. Otherwise, xi = 0 and Pr
σ
v0(Reach(Wi)) = 0.
Hence, valGi (v) = 0 for all histories xv consistent with σ, and the inequality holds as well.
Now, by Lemma 3.4, we can extend σ to a pure Nash equilibrium with payoff x.
(4⇒ 1) Trivial.
Under the additional assumption that all objectives are ω-regular, the implications
(2⇒ 5) and (5⇒ 6) are proven analogously (using Lemma 3.5 instead of Lemma 3.4); the
implication (6⇒ 1) is trivial.
As an immediate consequence of Proposition 5.1, we can conclude that pure finite-state
strategies are as powerful as arbitrary randomised strategies as far as the existence of Nash
equilibria with binary payoffs in finite SMGs with ω-regular objectives is concerned.
Corollary 5.2. Let (G, v0) be a finite SMG with ω-regular objectives, and let x ∈ {0, 1}Π.
There exists a Nash equilibrium of (G, v0) with payoff x if and only if there exists a pure
finite-state Nash equilibrium of (G, v0) with payoff x.
Proof. The claim follows from Proposition 5.1 and the fact that every SMG with ω-regular
objectives can be reduced to one with parity objectives (using finite memory).
5.2. Computational Complexity. We can now give an algorithm that decides StrQualNE
for SMGs with Muller objectives. The algorithm relies on Proposition 5.1, which allows us
to reduce StrQualNE to an MDP problem.
Formally, given a Muller SMG G = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π,∆, χ, (Fi)i∈Π) and a binary payoff
x = (xi)i∈Π, we define the Markov decision process G(x) as follows: Let Z ⊆ V be the set of
all vertices v such that valGi (v) = 0 for each player i with xi = 0; the set of vertices of G(x) is
precisely the set Z, with the set of vertices controlled by player 0 being Z0 :=
⋃
i∈Π(Vi∩Z); if
Z = ∅, we define G(x) to be a trivial MDP with the empty set as its objective. The transition
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relation of G(x) is the restriction of ∆ to transitions between Z-states. Note that the
transition relation of G(x) is well-defined since Z is a subarena of G. Finally, the single
objective in G(x) is Reach(T ) where T ⊆ Z is the union of all end components U ⊆ Z with
payoff x.
Lemma 5.3. Let (G, v0) be a finite Muller SMG, and let x ∈ {0, 1}Π. Then (G, v0) has a
Nash equilibrium with payoff x if and only if valG(x)(v0) = 1.
Proof. (⇒) Assume that (G, v0) has a Nash equilibrium with payoff x. By Proposition 5.1,
there exists a strategy profile σ of (G, v0) with payoff x such that Prσv0(Reach(V \ Z)) = 0.
We claim that Prσv0(Reach(T )) = 1. Otherwise, by Lemma 2.2, there would exist an end
component U ⊆ Z such that Prσv0({pi ∈ V ω : Inf(pi) = U}) > 0, and U is either not winning
for some player i with xi = 1 or it is winning for some player i with xi = 0. But then
σ cannot have payoff x, a contradiction. Now, since Prσv0(Reach(V \ Z)) = 0, the strategy
profile σ induces a strategy σ in G(x) such that Prσv0(X) = Prσv0(X) for every Borel set
X ⊆ Zω. In particular, Prσv0(Reach(T )) = 1 and hence valG(x)(v0) = 1.
(⇐) Assume that valG(x)(v0) = 1 (in particular, v0 ∈ Z), and let σ be an optimal
strategy in (G(x), v0). From σ, using Lemma 2.3, we can devise a strategy σ′ such that
Prσ
′
v0({pi ∈ V ω : Inf(pi) has payoff x}) = 1. Finally, σ′ can be extended to a strategy
profile σ of (G, v0) with payoff x such that Prσv0(Reach(V \ Z)) = 0. By Proposition 5.1,
this implies that (G, v0) has a Nash equilibrium with payoff x.
Since the values of an MDP with a reachability objective can be computed in polynomial
time, the difficult part lies in computing the MDP G(x) from G and x (i.e. its domain Z
and the target set T ). For Muller SMGs, polynomial space suffices to achieve this. In fact,
StrQualNE is Pspace-complete for these games.
Theorem 5.4. StrQualNE is Pspace-complete for Muller SMGs.
Proof. Hardness follows from Theorem 2.11. To prove membership in Pspace, we describe
a polynomial-space algorithm for deciding StrQualNE on Muller SMGs: On input G, v0, x,
the algorithm starts by computing for each player i with xi = 0 the set of vertices v such
that valGi (v) = 0, which can be done in polynomial space by Theorem 2.11. The intersection
of these sets is the domain Z of the Markov decision process G(x). If v0 is not contained in
this intersection, the algorithm immediately rejects. Otherwise, the algorithm determines
the union T of all end components with payoff x contained in Z by enumerating all subsets
of Z, one at a time, and checking which ones are end components with payoff x. Finally,
the algorithm computes (in polynomial time) the value valG(x)(v0) of the MDP G(x) from v0
and accepts if this value is 1. In all other cases, the algorithm rejects. The correctness of
the algorithm follows immediately from Lemma 5.3.
For games with Streett objectives, StrQualNE becomes NP-complete; we start by prov-
ing the upper bound.
Theorem 5.5. StrQualNE is in NP for Streett SMGs.
Proof. We describe a nondeterministic polynomial-time algorithm for solving StrQualNE:
On input G, v0, x, the algorithm starts by guessing a subarena Z ′ ⊆ V and for each player i
with xi = 0 a positional strategy τi of the coalition Π \ {i} in the coalition game Gi.
In the next step, the algorithm checks (in polynomial time) whether valτi(v) = 1 for each
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Figure 10. Reducing SAT to StrQualNE for games with Streett objectives.
vertex v ∈ Z ′ and each player i with xi = 0. If not, the algorithm rejects immediately.
Otherwise, the algorithm proceeds by guessing (at most) n := |V | subsets U1, . . . , Un ⊆ Z ′
and checks whether they are end components with payoff x (which can be done in polynomial
time). If yes, the algorithm sets T ′ :=
⋃n
j=1Uj and computes (in polynomial time) the
value valG(x)(v0) of the MDP G(x) from v0 with Z ′ substituted for Z and T ′ substituted
for T . If this value equals 1, the algorithm accepts; otherwise, it rejects.
It remains to be shown that the algorithm is correct: On the one hand, if (G, v0)
has a Nash equilibrium with payoff x, then the run of the algorithm where it guesses
Z ′ = Z, globally optimal positional strategies τi (which exist by Theorem 2.6) and end
components Ui such that T
′ = T will be accepting since then, by Lemma 5.3, valG(x)(v0) = 1.
On the other hand, in any accepting run of the algorithm we have Z ′ ⊆ Z and T ′ ⊆ T ,
and the computed value cannot be higher than valG(x)(v0); hence, val
G(x)(v0) = 1, and
Lemma 5.3 guarantees the existence of a Nash equilibrium with payoff x.
The matching lower bound does even hold for deterministic two-player Streett games
and was established in [58].
Theorem 5.6. StrQualNE is NP-hard for deterministic two-player Streett games.
Proof. The proof is accomplished by a variant of the proof for NP-hardness of the qualitative
decision problem for deterministic two-player zero-sum Rabin-Streett games [29] and by a
reduction from SAT. Given a Boolean formula ϕ = C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cm in conjunctive normal
form, where without loss of generality m ≥ 1 and each clause is nonempty, we construct a
deterministic two-player Streett game G as follows: For each clause C, the game G has a
vertex C, which is controlled by player 0, and for each literal L occurring in ϕ, there is a
vertex L, which is controlled by player 1. There are edges from a clause to each literal that
occurs in this clause, and from a literal to each clause occurring in ϕ. The structure of the
game is depicted in Fig. 10. Player 0’s objective is given by the empty Streett objective,
i.e. she wins every play of the game, whereas player 1’s objective consists of all Streett
pairs of the form ({X}, {¬X}) or ({¬X}, {X}), i.e. she wins if, for each variable X, either
X and ¬X are both visited infinitely often or neither of them is.
Clearly, G can be constructed from ϕ in polynomial time. We claim that ϕ is satisfiable
if and only if (G, C1) has a Nash equilibrium with payoff (1, 0).
(⇒) Assume that ϕ is satisfiable, and consider the following positional strategy σ0 of
player 0: whenever the play reaches a clause, then σ0 plays to a literal that is mapped to
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true by the satisfying assignment. This strategy ensures that for each variable X at most
one of the literals X or ¬X is visited infinitely often. Hence, (σ0, σ1) is a Nash equilibrium
of (G, C1) with payoff (1, 0) for every strategy σ1 of player 1.
(⇐) Let (σ0, σ1) be a Nash equilibrium of (G, C1) with payoff (1, 0), and assume that ϕ is
not satisfiable. Consider the two-player zero-sum Rabin-Streett game G˜, which is derived
from G by setting player 0’s objective to the complement of player 1’s objective. We claim
that player 1 has a winning strategy in (G˜, C1), which she could use to improve her payoff
in (G, C1), a contradiction to (σ0, σ1) being a Nash equilibrium. By determinacy, we only
need to show that player 0 does not have a winning strategy. Let τ be an optimal positional
strategy of player 0 in (G˜, C1) (which exists by Theorem 2.6). Since ϕ is unsatisfiable,
there must exist a variable X and clauses C and C ′ such that τ(C) = X and τ(C ′) = ¬X.
But player 1 can counter this strategy by playing from X to C ′ and from any other literal
to C. Hence, τ is not winning.
For games with Rabin objectives, the situation is more delicate. One might think
that, because of the duality of Rabin and Streett objectives, StrQualNE is in coNP for
SMGs with Rabin objectives.2 However, as we will see later, this is rather unlikely, and
we can only show that the problem lies in the class PNP[log] of problems solvable by a
deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that may perform a logarithmic number of queries
to an NP oracle. In fact, the same upper bound holds for games with a Streett or a Rabin
objective for each player.
Theorem 5.7. StrQualNE is in PNP[log] for Streett-Rabin SMGs.
Proof. Let us describe a polynomial-time algorithm performing a logarithmic number of
queries to an NP oracle for the problem. On input G, v0, x, the algorithm starts by de-
termining for each vertex v and each Rabin player i with xi = 0 whether val
G
i (v) = 0.
Naively implemented, this requires a super-logarithmic number of queries to the oracle.
To reduce the number of queries, we use a neat trick, due to Hemachandra [39]. Let us
denote by R and S the set of players i ∈ Π with xi = 0 who have a Rabin, respectively
a Streett objective. Instead of looping through all pairs of a vertex and a player, we start
by determining the number r of all pairs (v, i) such that i ∈ R and valGi (v) = 0. It is not
difficult to see that this number can be computed using binary search by performing only
a logarithmic number of queries to an NP oracle, which we can use for deciding whether
valGi (v) > 0 (Corollary 2.10). Then we perform one more query; we ask whether for each
player i ∈ R ∪ S there exists a set Zi ⊆ V as well as sets U1, . . . , U|V | ⊆ V and positional
strategies (σi)i∈R and (τi)i∈S , where σi is a strategy of player i and τi is a strategy of the
coalition Π \ {i} in the coalition game Gi, with the following properties:
(1) Z :=
⋂
i∈R∪S Zi is a subarena of G with v0 ∈ Z, and
∑
i∈R |Zi| = r;
(2) valσi(v) > 0 for each player i ∈ R and each v ∈ V \ Zi;
(3) valτi(v) = 1 for each player i ∈ S and each v ∈ Zi;
(4) each Uj is an end component of G ↾ Z with payoff x;
(5) the value from v0 of the MDP that is obtained from G by restricting to vertices inside Z
and imposing the objective Reach(
⋃{U1, . . . , U|V |}) equals 1.
This query can be decided by an NP oracle by guessing suitable sets and strategies and
verifying (1)–(5) in polynomial time. If the answer to the query is yes, the algorithm accepts;
otherwise it rejects.
2In fact, Ummels and Wojtczak [60] claimed that the problem is in coNP.
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Obviously, the algorithm runs in polynomial time. To see that the algorithm is correct,
first note that for each player i ∈ R the set Zi does not only include all v ∈ V such that
valGi (v) = 0, but also excludes all other vertices. Otherwise, there would exist a vertex
v ∈ Zi with valGi (v) > 0. But then the number of pairs (v, i) with i ∈ R and valGi (v) = 0
would be strictly less than r, a contradiction. Now, the correctness of the algorithm follows
with the same reasoning as in the proof of Theorem 5.5.
Remark 5.8. For a bounded number of players, StrQualNE is in coNP for SMGs with Rabin
objectives.
Regarding lower bounds for StrQualNE in SMGs with Rabin objectives, we start by
proving that the problem is coNP-hard, even for deterministic two-player games.
Theorem 5.9. StrQualNE is coNP-hard for deterministic two-player Rabin games.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 5.6 and is accomplished by a reduction
from the unsatisfiability problem for Boolean formulae in conjunctive normal form. Given
a Boolean formula ϕ = C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cm in conjunctive normal form, where without loss of
generality m ≥ 1 and each clause is nonempty, we construct a deterministic two-player
Rabin game G as follows. The arena of G is the same as in the proof of Theorem 5.6,
depicted in Fig. 10. However, this time player 1 wins every play of the game (her objective
consists of the single Rabin pair (V, ∅)), and player 0’s objective consists of all Rabin pairs
of the form ({X}, {¬X}) or ({¬X}, {X}).
Clearly, G can be constructed from ϕ in polynomial time. We claim that the ϕ is
unsatisfiable if and only if (G, C1) has a Nash equilibrium with payoff (0, 1).
(⇒) Assume that ϕ is unsatisfiable, and consider the two-player zero-sum Rabin-Streett
game G˜, which is derived from G by setting player 1’s objective to the complement of
player 0’s objective. Let σ1 be a globally optimal strategy for player 1 in this game. We
claim that σ1 is winning in (G0, C1). Consequently, (σ0, σ1) is a Nash equilibrium of (G, C1)
with payoff (0, 1) for every strategy σ0 of player 0. Otherwise, player 0 would have a
positional winning strategy in (G˜, C1). But a positional strategy τ of player 0 picks for each
clause a literal contained in this clause. Since ϕ is unsatisfiable, there must exist a variableX
and clauses C and C ′ such that τ(C) = X and τ(C ′) = ¬X. Player 1 could counter this
strategy by playing from X to C ′ and from any other literal to C, a contradiction.
(⇐) Let (σ0, σ1) be a Nash equilibrium of (G, C1) with payoff (0, 1), and assume that
ϕ is satisfiable. Consider the following positional strategy τ of player 0: whenever the play
reaches a clause, then τ plays to a literal that is mapped to true by the satisfying assignment.
This strategy ensures that for each variable X at most one of the literals X or ¬X is visited
infinitely often. Since the construction of G ensures that, under any strategy profile, at least
one literal is visited infinitely often, τ ensures a winning play for player 0. Hence, player 0
can improve her payoff by playing τ instead of σ0, a contradiction to the fact that (σ0, σ1)
is a Nash equilibrium.
The next result shows that StrQualNE is not only coNP-hard for Rabin games, but
also NP-hard. In fact, it is even NP-hard to decide whether in a deterministic Rabin game
there exists a play that fulfils the objective of each player.
Proposition 5.10. The problem of deciding, given a deterministic Rabin game, whether
there exists a play that is won by each player is NP-hard.
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Figure 11. Reducing SAT to deciding the existence of a play winning for all players in a
deterministic Rabin game.
Proof. We reduce from SAT: given a Boolean formula ϕ = C1 ∧ · · · ∧ Cm in conjunctive
normal form over propositional variables X1, . . . ,Xn, where without loss of generality m ≥ 1
and each clause is nonempty, we show how to construct in polynomial time a deterministic
(n+1)-player Rabin game G such that ϕ is satisfiable if and only if there exists a play of G
that is won by each player. The game has vertices C1, . . . , Cm and, for each clause C and
each literal L that occurs in C, a vertex (C,L). All vertices are controlled by player 0.
There are edges from a clause Cj to each vertex (Cj , L) such that L occurs in Cj and from
there to C(j mod m)+1. The arena of G is schematically depicted in Fig. 11. The Rabin
objectives are defined as follows:
− player 0 wins every play of G;
− player i 6= 0 wins if each vertex of the form (C,Xi) is visited only finitely often or each
vertex of the form (C,¬Xi) is visited only finitely often.
Clearly, G can be constructed from ϕ in polynomial time. To establish the reduction,
we need to show that ϕ is satisfiable if and only if there exists a play of G that is won by
each player.
(⇒) Assume that α : {X1, . . . ,Xn} → {true, false} is a satisfying assignment of ϕ.
Clearly, the positional strategy of player 0 where from each clause C she plays to a fixed
vertex (C,L) such that L is mapped to true by α induces a play that is won by each player.
(⇐) Assume that there exists a play pi of G that is won by each player. Obviously,
it is not possible that both a vertex (C,Xi) and a vertex (C
′,¬Xi) are visited infinitely
often in pi since this would violate player i’s objective. Consider the variable assignment
that maps X to true if some vertex (C,X) is visited infinitely often in pi. This assignment
satisfies the formula because, by the construction of G, for each clause C there exists a
literal L in C such that the vertex (C,L) is visited infinitely often in pi.
It follows from Theorem 5.9 and Proposition 5.10 that, unless NP = coNP, StrQualNE
is not contained in NP ∪ coNP, even for deterministic Rabin games. With a little more
effort, one can show that StrQualNE is DP-hard for deterministic Rabin games (see [59]).
Finally, for stochastic Rabin games, we can show that StrQualNE is PNP[log]-complete.
Theorem 5.11. StrQualNE is PNP[log]-hard for Rabin SMGs.
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Proof. Wagner [62] and, independently, Buss and Hay [11] showed that PNP[log] is the closure
of NP with respect to polynomial-time Boolean formula reducibility. The canonical complete
problem for this class is to decide, given a Boolean combination α of statements of the form
“ϕ is satisfiable”, where ϕ ranges over all Boolean formulae, whether α evaluates to true.
We claim that for every such statement α we can construct in polynomial time a Rabin
SMG (G, v0) such that α evaluates to true if and only if (G, v0) has a Nash equilibrium
with payoff (0, 1, . . . , 1). The game G is constructed by induction on the complexity of α;
without loss of generality, we assume that negations are only applied to atoms. If α is of
the form “ϕ is satisfiable” or “ϕ is not satisfiable”, then the existence of a suitable game G
follows from Proposition 5.10 or Theorem 5.9, respectively.
Now, let α = α1 ∧ α2, and assume that we already have constructed suitable games
(G1, v1) and (G2, v2), played by the same players 0, 1, . . . , n. The game G is the disjoint
union of G1 and G2 combined with one new stochastic vertex v0. From v0, the game moves
with probability 12 each to v1 or v2. Obviously, (G, v0) has a Nash equilibrium with payoff
(0, 1, . . . , 1) if and only if both (G1, v1) and (G2, v2) have such an equilibrium.
Finally, let α = α1 ∨ α2, and assume that we already have constructed suitable games
(G1, v1) and (G2, v2), again played by the same players 0, 1, . . . , n. As in the previous case,
the game G is the disjoint union of G1 and G2 combined with one new vertex v0, which has
transitions to both v1 and v2. However, this time v0 is controlled by player 1. Obviously,
(G, v0) has a Nash equilibrium with payoff (0, 1, . . . , 1) if and only if at least one of the
games (G1, v1) and (G2, v2) has such an equilibrium.
Our next aim is to prove that StrQualNE is in UP ∩ coUP for parity SMGs. We will
make use of Algorithm 5.1, which computes for a game G with priority functions (Ωi)i∈Π
and x ∈ {0, 1}Π the union of all end components with payoff x. The algorithm is a straight-
forward adaptation of the algorithm for computing the union of all winning end components
in a Streett MDP [17]. At the heart of the algorithm lies the procedure FindEC that re-
turns on input X ⊆ V the union of all end components with payoff x that are contained
in X. The procedure starts by computing all end components maximal in X. If such an
end component U has payoff x, all vertices in U can be added to the result of the procedure.
Otherwise, there exists a player i such that either xi = 0 and the least priority for player i
in U is odd or xi = 1 and the least priority for player i in U is even. Each end component
with payoff x inside U must exclude all vertices with this least priority. Hence, we call the
procedure recursively on the subset of U that results from removing these vertices.
Note that on input X, the total number of recursive calls to the procedure FindEC is
bounded by |X|. Since, additionally, the set of all end components maximal in a set X can
be computed in polynomial time, this proves that Algorithm 5.1 runs in polynomial time.
Theorem 5.12. StrQualNE is in UP ∩ coUP for parity SMGs.
Proof. A UP algorithm that decides StrQualNE for parity SMGs works as follows: On input
G, v0, x, the algorithm starts by guessing, for each player i with xi = 0, the set Zi of vertices v
with valGi (v) = 0. Then, for each v ∈ V , the guess whether v ∈ Zi or v /∈ Zi is verified
by running the UP algorithm for the respective problem. If some guess was not correct,
the algorithm rejects immediately. Otherwise, it constructs the subarena Z :=
⋂
i∈Π:xi=0 Zi
and uses Algorithm 5.1 to determine the union T of all end components with payoff x. If
v0 /∈ Z, the algorithm rejects immediately. Otherwise, it computes in polynomial time the
value valG(x)(v0) of the MDP G(x) from v0. If this value equals 1, the algorithm accepts;
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Algorithm 5.1. Finding end components in parity SMGs.
Input: parity SMG G = (Π, V, (Vi)i∈Π,∆, χ, (Ωi)i∈Π), x = (xi)i∈Π ∈ {0, 1}Π
Output:
⋃{U ⊆ V : U is an end component of G with payoff x}
output FindEC(V )
procedure FindEC(X)
Z := ∅
compute all end components of G maximal in X
for each such end component U do
P := {i ∈ Π : minΩi(χ(U)) ≡ xi mod 2}
if P = ∅ then
(∗ U is an end component with payoff x ∗)
Z := Z ∪ U
else
(∗ U has the wrong payoff ∗)
Y :=
⋂
i∈P {v ∈ U : Ωi(χ(v)) > minΩi(χ(U))}
Z := Z ∪ FindEC(Y )
end if
end for
return Z
end procedure
otherwise, it rejects. Analogously, an algorithm for the complement of StrQualNE accepts
if and only if v0 /∈ Z or valG(x)(v0) < 1.
Obviously, both algorithms run in polynomial time. Moreover, on each input there
exists at most one accepting run because the algorithms only accept if each of the sets Zi
has been guessed correctly. Finally, their correctness follows from Lemma 5.3.
Recall from Section 2.6 that it is an open question whether the qualitative decision
problem for parity S2Gs admits a polynomial-time algorithm. Such an algorithm would al-
low us compute the domain of the MDP G(x) efficiently, which would imply that StrQualNE
is in P for parity SMGs. In fact, given a class C of parity S2Gs for which the qualitative
decision problem is in P, we can easily derive a class of parity SMGs for which StrQualNE
is in P, namely the class C∗ of all parity SMGs such that for each player i the coalition
game Gi is in C.
Theorem 5.13. Let C be a class of finite parity S2Gs such that the qualitative decision
problem is decidable in P for games in C. Then StrQualNE is in P for games in C∗.
Proof. Consider the algorithm given in the proof of Theorem 5.12. For each player i, the
set Zi can be computed in polynomial time if Gi ∈ C, and there is no need to guess this set.
The resulting deterministic algorithm still runs in polynomial time.
By Theorem 2.12, for each d ∈ N, the qualitative decision problem for parity S2Gs with
at most d priorities belongs to P. Hence, it follows from Theorem 5.13 that StrQualNE
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is decidable in polynomial time for parity SMGs with at most d priorities. In particular,
StrQualNE is in P for (co-)Büchi SMGs.
Corollary 5.14. For each d ∈ N, StrQualNE is decidable in polynomial time for parity
SMGs with at most d priorities.
6. Conclusion
We have analysed the complexity of deciding whether a stochastic multiplayer game with
ω-regular objectives has a Nash equilibrium whose payoff falls into a certain interval. Our
results demonstrate that this problem is more complicated for multiplayer games than
for two-player zero-sum games. In particular, the problem of deciding the existence of
a Nash equilibrium where player 0 wins almost surely is undecidable for simple stochastic
multiplayer games, whereas the same problem is decidable in polynomial time for two-player
zero-sum simple stochastic games. On the positive side, we have shown that the strictly
qualitative fragment of NE has a complexity that is comparable to the complexity of the
qualitative decision problem for two-player zero-sum games.
Several directions for future research come to mind: First, one can study other restric-
tions of NE that might be decidable. For example, it is plausible that the restriction of
NE to games with two players is decidable. Second, it would be interesting to extend our
results to other game models such as concurrent games [55, 27] or games with quantitative
payoff functions.
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